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Abstract  
 
Canadian humanitarian interventions have been used to consolidate the country’s imperialist 
interests in the times of humanitarian crises (Razack, 2007; Barry-Shaw and Jay, 2012; Albo, 
2014). On the aftermath of Typhoon Yolanda (english name: Haiyan) in the Philippines, the 
strongest typhoon ever recorded to hit landfall on November 8, 2013, Canada was one of the 
countries to respond through the deployment of troops, disbursing aid through iNGOs, and 
temporarily expediting immigration applications from typhoon-struck areas. Canadian 
humanitarian interventions in post-Yolanda disaster recovery and rehabilitation signal 
attempts to strengthen its pre-existing geohistorical connections in the Philippines, namely 
labour migration, resource extraction and militarization. However, local Non-Governmental 
Organizations  (NGOs) and People’s Organizations (POs) in Eastern Visayas have found 
ways to assert agency over their own disaster recovery. Drawing from interviews, 
institutional mapping and review of news articles and reports, this paper documents how 
local organizations navigate the contradictions in the humanitarian aid industry by exercising 
prudence when selecting which iNGOs to partner with, specifically only collaborating with 
ones that respect their autonomy and working on joint projects that complement the priorities 
of the POs they work with. The POs, mainly in the form of peasant associations, and local 
NGOs, the Leyte Centre for Development (LCDE) and Eastern Visayas Rural Assistance 
Program (EVRAP), aim to foster local development through disaster recovery and 
rehabilitation projects, ultimately undermining neoliberal approaches to development. The 
spirit of bayanihan, meaning community unity, is evoked as a consistent motif in this paper: 
first, as the name of the counterinsurgency program that subjects POs and NGOs to military 
violence; second, as an Indigenous practice of labour exchange and communal farming that 
peasants return to, as a form of disaster recovery; third, as a virtue evoked through the 
humanitarian cooperation of iNGOs, local NGOs and POs in disaster recovery. This very 
 v 
unity with iNGOs that LCDE and its partner POs are able to establish, is what undermines the 
consolidation of Canadian imperialism in their region in the aftermath of typhoon Yolanda. 
The research reveals how disaster survivors can act as active actors in recovering from not 
only from disasters caused by natural hazards, but from poverty and inequity that have made 
their communities vulnerable to disasters in the first place. 
 
  
 vi 
Foreword: Relationship of Paper to Plan of Study 
 
The Area of Concentration in my Plan of Study are settler colonialism and politics of 
immigration, gendered labour migration and the Filipina/o Diaspora, environmental justice 
and disaster imperialism. These include developing insights into how the character of settler 
colonialism can deepen my understanding of the racial-colonial formations in Canada. 
Further, I examined the specific ways im/migration processes are located within Canadian 
imperialist and settler colonial logics. And lastly, I examined what social movements can 
reveal about the political and cultural consciousness of Filipinos in Canada and in the 
Philippines. Environmental justice as a form of social movement was paid attention to.  The 
learning objectives outlined in the Plan of Study are as follows: 
 
Learning Objective 1.1: to study settler colonialism and the different ways it is theorized in 
the fields of Critical Race Studies, Feminist Studies, Environmental Studies, 
Native/Indigenous Studies. 
 
Learning Objective 1.2: to gain analytical and theoretical tools to understand racial-colonial 
formations and national identity formation in Canada. 
 
Learning Objective 2.1: to study the development of racialized domestic work in Canada, 
specifically through specific labour importation programs such as the Foreign Domestic 
Movement and the Live-in Caregiver Program. 
 
Learning Objective 2.2: to develop theoretical tools to locate gendered labour and feminized 
migration within legacies of settler colonialism and imperialism. 
 
Learning Objective 3:1: To gain a general understanding of the various ways and processes 
Filipinos in Canada and the Philippines engage with social movements. 
 
Learning Objective 3.2: To develop analytical and theoretical tools to be able to analyze 
social movements in within specific historical contexts of the Philippines and Canada. 
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 The Major Research Paper – which aims to examine how the Canada consolidates 
imperialist relations through disaster recovery and rehabilitation in the Philippines - fits well 
into my Area of Concentration. The paper serves as a culmination of the theoretical and 
analytical skills I have acquired while fulfilling the learning objectives of my Plan of Study. 
Settler colonialism has laid the foundation for the establishment of Canadian imperialism in 
the Philippines (Learning Objectives 1.1 and 1.2). This is most apparent through the history 
of racialized domestic work in Canada (Learning Objectives 2.1 and 2.2). While my learning 
objectives focused on labour migration, the theoretical skills I have learned from my 
coursework led me to in-depth study of other geohistoric connections between the Philippines 
and Canada. This resulted to the inclusion of resource extraction, militarization and 
humanitarian aid intervention as sites of inquiry in my research. Finally, this research 
documents how social movements in the Philippines, through local People’s Organizations 
and Non-Governmental Organization, navigates and resists the consolidation of Canadian 
imperialism by using humanitarian aid in fulfilling the economic priorities of local 
communities (Learning Objectives 3.1 and 3.2). The paper demonstrates the application of 
the theoretical and analytical tools I have learned all throughout my studies. The major 
research paper fits into the overarching themes of humanitarian aid, disaster recovery, 
Canadian imperialism and social movements to reveal how survivors can act as active actors 
in recovering from not only from disasters caused by natural hazards, but from poverty and 
inequity caused by centuries of colonialism and imperialism.  
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Glossary of abbreviations 
 
ABBAYT - Aliyansa ng mga Biktima ng Bayong Yolanda sa Tacloban 
ADB - Asian Development Bank 
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CARHRIHL - Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights & International 
Humanitarian Law  
CBDM - Community Based Disaster Management 
CDRC - Citizens’ Disaster Response Centre 
CDRN - Citizens’ Disaster Response Network 
CMO - Civil-Military Operations  
COIN - Counterinsurgency 
CPA - Cordillera Peoples Alliance  
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DART - Disaster Response Assistance Team 
DI - Devonshire Initiative 
DSWD - Department of Social and Welfare Development 
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GRP - Government of the Republic of the Philippines 
ICRC - International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) 
iNGO - International Non-governmental Organization 
LCDE - Leyte Centre for Development  
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LGU - Local Government Unit 
NAFCON - National Alliance for Filipino Concerns 
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NEDA- National Economic and Development Authority  
ND - National Democratic  
NDF - National Democratic Front  
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NGO - Non-governmental Organization 
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PO - People’s Organization 
SAGUPA - Samahan han Gudti nga Parag-uma ha Sinirangan Bisayas (Alliance of Peasants 
in Eastern Visayas) 
SAP - Structural Adjustment Program 
TVI - Toronto Ventures Incorporated 
WB – World Bank
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Introduction       
 
“Binalonan will be flooded tonight,” my father said. “The rice in Binalonan will be 
destroyed tonight.” 
“Do you think so, Father?” Amado said. 
But he knew that my father spoke wisely. Amado was only making conversation. 
 
     Carlos Bulosan, America is in the Heart 
 
“And then typhoons come and everyone says they never see it coming.” 
      Patricia Evangelista, journalist 
 
 
While waiting on the subway platform, the most recent death toll from a landslide in Luzon 
flashed on the screen. My friend looked away, exasperated, “the only time we make it to the 
news is when there is a disaster.” I remained silent and watched as the next news flashed. It is 
true, I thought to myself. For days, images of the damage would fill primetime news: women 
mourning for their children buried under soil and rubble, politicians doing photo ops, and the 
heroism of foreign military troops. 
 The coverage of the aftermath of Typhoon Yolanda (English name: Haiyan) signalled 
to me how very little control our communities have over how the country is being reported 
about. In organizing circles, at dinner tables, and in Facebook posts, we would discuss the 
politics of the typhoon, climate change, and which organizations we should send money to. A 
Filipina journalist, then working for the Vancouver Observer, Krystle Alarcon, regularly 
published articles that highlighted the sociological dimensions of the disaster. One article for 
instance, discussed the contradictions and implications of the international and local media 
coverage of the disaster (Alarcon, 2013). Another discussed how Canada’s extractive 
industry contributed to the makings of a supertyphoon such as Yolanda, and covering the 
activism of disaster survivors in Eastern Visayas (Alarcon, 2013). But her critical 
perspectives were dominated by the usual images of a Third World disaster.  
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 Before I started the MES program, I was invited to speak at an Accessibility 
Community Engagement (ACE) Seminar Series event on March 11, 2014. The seminar was 
entitled ‘Health, Disablement, Environmental Racism and State Violence’. Here, I shared 
how the survivors of Typhoons Pablo and Yolanda organized and conducted recovery 
projects for their own communities. While talking about disasters with a smile on my face, I 
understood then the importance of, to put it simply, showing the other side of the story. I 
ended the presentation with a song from Saturnino, a remote sitio in Compostella Valley 
where communities successfully recovered from the damages wrought by Typhoon Pablo 
using self-directed initiatives: 
Pablo thought, Pablo thought 
This ugly typhoon 
Despite its ugliness 
Could be a thing of beauty 
 
Growing up in an urban centre like Manila has limited my understanding of the 
effects of typhoons on the rural areas of the Philippines. City infrastructure can usually 
withstand heavy rainfall, and my relatives in the countryside did not live in areas vulnerable 
to flash floods and landslides. In high school, I volunteered to assemble relief packaged for 
typhoon victims funded by big companies such as the national television station, ABS/CBN. 
Such projects further reinforced the class division between the ‘safe’ middle class and 
‘victims’ of disaster. Inactive from social movements at that time, I did not know of any 
disaster relief efforts outside of charitable or state-funded ones.  
 When Yolanda struck in November 2013, international news coverage of the typhoon 
was mired in discourses of victimhood and helping impulses. Anderson Cooper blamed the 
Philippine government of incompetence, while images of Canadian relief efforts depicted the 
competence and expertise of military personnel. Since migrating to Toronto in 2005, I 
experienced Yolanda through the dozens of fundraising events organized by members of the 
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Filipino diaspora. The community, including the left, was caught up in ongoing debates about 
which organizations ‘deserve’ the money. But because of Canada’s pledge to match 
donations to Canadian charities, many fundraising proceeds ended up going directly to 
international NGOs.  
 Having read several critical analyses of Hurricane Katrina, I was more aware of the 
complexity of Typhoon Yolanda as a phenomena. It was not hard to problematize the heavy 
emphasis on the deployment of the Canadian Armed Forces on the ground, the dependence 
on NGOs for conducting humanitarian assistance, and the focus on strengthening Philippine 
economic trade agreements with Canada as a form of disaster rehabilitation. Living in 
Canada, the state responsible for building and sending the “trojan horses of neoliberalism” as 
David Harvey would describe NGOs (2005, p. 177), allowed me to witness how the state has 
discursively and materially created a disaster and a humanitarian crisis out of the typhoon. 
 While I have not been substantially affected by typhoons in the Philippines, I identify 
the Filipino community’s experiences, including my own, as shaped by the sites of 
interaction that characterize the Philippine-Canada relationship. In a community event in 
2015, the Secretary-General of the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA), Abigail Anongos, 
expressed the CPA’s need for people to conduct research that will be useful for their 
communities. In particular, because mining companies are strategically subsidiaries of larger 
transnational companies, the movement finds it difficult to identify which mining industries 
are Canadian-owned. They request that students and researchers in Canada interrogate the 
role of the state in enabling these mining companies, as well as support Indigenous 
communities here in their struggle against the encroachment of their territories. Her request 
compelled me to intentionally examine what the role of the Canadian state in post-Yolanda 
disaster efforts. But as a researcher coming from a middle-class background, Tagalog-
speaking, working with NGO workers, PO organizers and community members from 
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different class, and ethno-linguist background, I had to be aware of my own social location 
and positionality. I was confronted with my position as an outsider on April 7th, my first full 
day in Tacloban City. I visited one of the temporary shelters for disaster survivors in 
Tacloban City. More commonly called bunkhouses, the residents used to live from different 
parts of the province whose homes were damaged from the typhoon. They have been living 
in these “substandard and undersized” houses for three years now, while the construction and 
distribution of permanent shelters were severely delayed (IBON Foundation, 2015, p 
12).  The residents shared with me how the poor ventilation and overcrowding worsened 
residents’ health conditions. Electricity and water supplies were not consistent. Worse, they 
were far away from their former sources of livelihood. 
 The residents of the bunkhouse, some of them members of People’s Surge, a region-
wide alliance of disaster survivors, were eager to chat. They were willing to share their 
conditions, their lives before and after Yolanda, and what they think should be done. Most of 
what they shared are already documented in a few reports and news articles, most thorough is 
the report Disaster Upon Disaster, produced by the research institute IBON Foundation. The 
residents asked me kung pwede sila naman ang magtanong sa akin [if they can ask me a 
question in return]. They asked, “anong maggagawa mo para sa amin? [What can you do for 
us?]” Several of them said that this year alone, two other researchers came to visit them and 
interview them. Many researchers have asked them to retell traumatic stories. Some of them 
expressed how they would prefer not to retell some stories, but they do it anyway hoping that 
one day, help would come and their lives would improve. “Pero wala naman ngyayari 
[Nothing comes out of it].”  
 I return to the question that the editors of the Philippine Sociological Review raises, 
was I one of the researchers who have become part of the disaster industrial complex that 
"commoditize affected communities?” (Curato & Ong, 2015, p. 17). After the conversation 
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with the residents of the bunkhouses, I had to ask myself again, why am I here? what do I 
need to do here? Tuhiwai-Smith (1999) argues that while researchers conduct research with 
Indigenous communities may have learned to acknowledge their problematic roles as 
outsiders, she asks the “larger set of judgements on criteria that a researcher cannot prepare 
for, such as: Is her spirit clear? […] Are they useful to us? Can they fix up our generator? 
Can you do anything for us?” These questions serve as the moral compass guiding the rest of 
my fieldwork and writing.  
 
Setting the framework: concurrents in disaster scholarship 
 The very definition of disaster remains a contested term within the realm of critical 
scholarship (Quarantelli, 1998). As scholars are confronted with shifting meanings of disaster 
mobilized by various institutions, governments, transnational entities, and international 
NGOs, the instability of its meaning was compelling enough for disasters to be examined as a 
social condition. Gilbert (1998) outlines the transformation from the ‘paradigm of war 
approach,’ that is agent-specific, to the two paradigms, namely: ‘disaster as social 
vulnerability,’ and ‘disaster as uncertainty’ (p. 12-16). The departure from the paradigm of 
viewing physical agents and extreme events, including typhoons, earthquakes, chemical 
explosions and armed conflict, as the problem of disaster research (Hewitt, 1998; Gilbert, 
1998) has created more room to rather interrogate disaster as a social construct. Hewitt 
further defines disaster as “(loss of) control -- meaning control, within a particular kind of 
public control,” at a time when “science and administrative technologies have been deployed 
by modern states in the fields of disaster reduction and emergency measures” (p. 90). The 
debunking of the myth of the ‘natural’ disasters have resulted in multiple social approaches to 
disaster. Most notable are the overlaps and differences in the use of the vulnerability concept. 
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At Risk: Natural hazards, people’s vulnerability and disasters (2004), begins with 
reiterating how inadequate the focus on the naturalness of disasters in correctly approaching 
disasters in research and practice (Wisner et al). In particular, they emphasize how other 
events that have affected a greater portion of the world’s population, such as violent conflict, 
illness and hunger, are largely under researched within the realm of disaster inquiry. Such 
events are the everyday realities of less developed countries (LCDs). This tendency, they 
note, is apparent in the UN declaration of the 1990s the UN International Decade of Natural 
Disaster Reduction. The book offers alternative approach that has emerged in disaster studies 
in the last 30 years, does not deny the factor of natural hazards as ‘trigger events’ but focuses 
on how social factors “operate to generate disasters by making people vulnerable” (p. 10).  
The authors also reminds us that analysing disaster “allows us to show why they 
should not be segregated from everyday living, and to show how risks involved in disasters 
must be connected with the vulnerability created for many people through the normal 
existence” (p.  4). While they celebrate the move from interrogating disasters from the 
‘natural’ to the ‘social,’ they note the ‘reluctance’ in addressing the social causes of disasters. 
In most cases, it is more ‘politically expedient’ to address the technical aspects of disaster 
risk reduction, than dealing with the root causes of vulnerability. Long-term and protracted, 
this work requires “placing the genesis of disaster in a longer time frame,” (p.  9) that 
inevitably raises debates on the sustainability of trends in development and globalization. 
Such transformation of societal and economic conditions can be met with political 
opposition, such as land reform, and investment in public services. They offer a definition of 
vulnerability as: “the characteristics of a person our group and their situation that influenced 
the capacity to dissipate, cope with, persist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard” 
(p. 11).  
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 Meanwhile Cultures of Disaster (Bankoff, 2003), discusses how the vulnerability 
concept makes a distinction between natural hazards and disasters. Drawing from disaster 
scholars Hewitt, Wisner and Watts, Bankoff defines ‘vulnerable populations’ as “those at 
risk, not simply because they're exposed to hazard, but as a result of her marginality, in turn, 
as determined by the combination of the set of variables such as class gender age electricity 
and disability that affects people's entitlement and empowerment, are there command over 
basic necessities and rights as broadly defined" (p. 12). While vulnerability as a concept and 
disaster studies has improved sociological methods in approaching disasters and societies, 
Hewitt argues that the hazards and vulnerability paradigms constitute disaster as a “regime of 
mechanism and control” that has a discursive character (p. 78). Bankoff further adds that the 
discourse continued to uphold the paradigm that developing countries are is essentially 
“spaces of vulnerability” and seen as zones of misrule. And that the cure for this condition is 
“the transfer and application of Western expertise” (p. 14). It is important to note that the 
survivors of large-scaled disasters, and consequently, the subject of disaster research, over the 
past decade live in the Third World. Hence, the relationships amongst research, language, 
race and imperialism cannot be ignored. The paradigm in fact reduces people, communities 
and their lives to “mass collective units, statistically distributed data points, and functions of 
abstract dimension” (Hewitt, p.79).  
 Such a problematic interpretation of vulnerability did not result in the publication of a 
scholarship that examine the conditions that makes populations vulnerable, and consequently 
did not result in changing these conditions as the focus of disaster risk reduction. In fact, 
Bankoff observes that scholarship within this framework, the vulnerable Third World is 
reinforced as inherently undeveloped and incapable of developing on their own. The 
assumption of inferiority and lack of agency did not arise from the emergence of the concept 
of vulnerability itself. Rather, Bankoff argues that the assumptions are the continuation of 
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ideologies that can be traced back from colonial times. Bankoff returns to the work of 
Edward Said to emphasize how that the infantilization of Third World peoples is rooted and 
the "western cultural hegemony" that dominates an array of thinking not just in literary 
imaginations, but also in our understandings of disaster and society. Such logics manifest in 
the forms of Western intervention that reflect the characteristics assigned to the Third World 
in specific historical contexts. For example, Bankoff identifies how the post-WWII 
development discourse resulted in the emergence of ‘aid.’ While from the 1990s, the UN-
declared Decade of Natural Disaster Reduction, vulnerability was responded ‘relief’ (p. 14). 
Furthermore, Bankoff reminds the readers that Western intervention in the forms of aid and 
relief must be understood as a product of the legacy of Cold war, and the Western world’s 
"unremitting struggle against Communism" (p. 15).   
 Similar to vulnerability, human security as a concept and an approach has been 
circulating in the international humanitarian arena as a framework in approaching disasters. 
In the edited volume Human Security and Natural Disasters, various scholars and policy 
analysts review in the most recent large-scale disasters such as the Indian Ocean tsunami, the 
earthquake in Haiti and Hurricane Katrina. The editors recognize the human security 
approach departs from “the traditional prioritization of state security, and instead identifies 
the individual as the primary benefit of security” (Hobson et al, 2014, p. i). Similar to the 
vulnerability concept, the human security approach emerged from an overt move away from 
the paradigm that disasters arise from purely natural phenomena, which the editors recognize 
as robbing populations of human agency. The human security approach recognizes that 
insecurity can be mitigated when there preparation before the natural hazard. The framework 
aims to “identify and respond to the underlying causes of human insecurity" (p. 7). Similar to 
Bankoff’s critique of vulnerability, Hobson (2014) discusses how the human security 
approach to natural disasters have failed to demonstrate a proficient and “clear casual” 
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understanding of “human insecurity is created” (p. 25). Extending Bankoff’s observations on 
how colonial logics continue to disaster discourse, I argue that the human security approach 
ultimately fails because it remains to be trapped within the logic that insecure populations 
live in zones of misrule. In a discussion on the socio-economic context in which created the 
Haitian earthquake a major disaster, Hobson himself cites “history of misrule and violence” 
as what subjected Haitians to “acute vulnerability” (p. 27).   
 While cognizant to problematic tendencies in disaster scholarship, At Risk: Natural 
hazards, people’s vulnerability and disasters offers the concept of ‘social production of 
vulnerability’ to analyse how vulnerabilities of populations to disasters. The concept 
highlights the need to situate disasters within historical and political contexts to reveal the 
root cause of vulnerabilities. The social production of vulnerability is outlined as follows: 
root causes, generating dynamic pressures, which then results in the production of unsafe 
conditions. The root causes of vulnerability, is regarded as the first chain of the progression 
of vulnerability. It is defined as "the interrelated set of widespread and general processes 
within a society in the world economy” (p. 52), naming economic, demographic, political 
processes are regarded as the most important causes of vulnerability. An analysis of history, 
to understand current distribution of power in society, is emphasized as extremely important 
in uncovering the connection between economic systems and the function of states, in 
relation to disaster vulnerability. The focus on root causes offers a framework that can 
potentially counter the narrative that human vulnerabilities are generated from zones of 
misrule.  
 Meanwhile dynamic pressures are immediate or contemporary "processes and 
activities that ‘translate’ the conditions of root causes both temporally and spatially into 
unsafe conditions” (p.  53). For example, Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) imposed 
on LDCs during the late 1970s and 1980s, as a form of consolidation of capitalism (root 
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causes), economic and ideological system at least 500 years old. SAPs have contributed to 
intensifying rural–urban migration (dynamic pressure), resulting from massive dispossession 
of farming land. Out-migration, as the authors suggest may lead to the loss of local 
knowledges that may aid in disaster prevention and recovery. Other few dynamic pressures 
named were urbanization, natural resource degradation, and livelihood diversification. On the 
other hand, unsafe conditions are “the specific forms in which the vulnerability of population 
is expressing time and space in conjunction with the hazard” (p. 55). Access to sound 
infrastructure, sustainable livelihood, and efforts of support are a few examples. 
E.L. Quarantelli, a leading disaster studies scholar, proposes that a new paradigm for 
disaster research must emerge from using non-Western frameworks. Even though studies on 
disaster studies have started interrogating disaster as a social construct, the frames of thinking 
still heavily relies on Western ideas. Thus, current theoretical frameworks are still dependent 
on concepts of vulnerability, hazards and culture. The research methods employed by disaster 
studies scholars both reflect and reinforce colonial knowledges. So while other scholars, such 
as Quarantelli (1998), have envisioned that the future of disaster studies must come from 
non-Eurocentric epistemologies, some scholars demand a decolonial shift in the methodology 
used by researchers who study disasters.  
I find Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s work (2002) on decolonial methodologies particularly 
useful. She explains that a researcher’s choice of theory is important because it “contains 
within it a method or methods for selecting and arranging, for prioritising what we see and 
do… and enables us to deal with contradictions and uncertainties. Perhaps more significantly, 
it gives us space to plan, to strategize, and to take greater control over our resistances” (p. 
38). Exploring the contradictions and uncertainties in particular contexts is a task I have taken 
up in this essay. If there is anything I have learned in my own journey as a researcher and 
community organizer, nothing is as simple as it seems. Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s classic and 
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relevant work Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (1999), asserts 
how ‘research is “inextricably linked with European imperialism and colonialism” (p. 1). She 
traces this epistemological violence to the very conception of History itself, which is the story 
of a people who came to be known as Human, and in opposition to the Other/non-Human. 
Denise Ferierra Da Silva (2007) further argues that the Human vs. non-Human binary is 
intrinsic to modern thought, and how the ontological differences assigned on non-humans 
mark the chronology of Human Time that starts with life and ends with death. I read the 
assignment of vulnerability and insecurity to bodies, as well as the assignment of zones of 
misrule to developing nations, as ontological differences that trap subjects of disaster 
research along the horizon of death (Da Silva, 2007).   
Indigenous Knowledge and Disaster Risk Reduction: From Practice to Policy (Shaw 
et al, 2009) states that during disaster recovery, Indigenous Knowledge (IK) “has been an 
effective to protect the lives in properties of people and communities." Coping mechanisms 
and regions that are prone to natural disasters are considered by the authors as forms of 
Indigenous Knowledge. They assert that indigenous knowledge it is important in disaster risk 
reduction. IK is given broad definition: community or local practices representations and 
interactions with each other and their natural environment (p. 5).  
Philippine Indigenous Knowledges are dynamic and are products “of people's process 
of acquisition and integration of their experiences overtime" (Cutabac, 2009, p. 181). Named 
as an “acquisition–integration process,” oral history it is regarded as tradition that can reveal 
relevant and practical ecological lessons. In their study of Manobo groups, they identified the 
massive loading operations of their ancestral lands increase their vulnerability to 
environmental hazards such as El Niño droughts (p. 182). Meanwhile, Noralene Uy and Rajib 
Shaw’s study (2009) of the Ivatans in the Batanes islands, demonstrated how IKs help them 
prepare for calamities. They argue the Ivatans as well as other indigenous communities in the 
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Philippines, demonstrate the value of indigenous knowledges in disaster risk reduction, and 
that ultimately, policy makers must “recognize indigenous knowledge as valid and legitimate 
given the values and benefits its use and work towards its integration in disaster risk 
reduction practice and policy” (2009, p.  193). Natural hazards, coping and adaptation as 
entrenched in our local systems of thought speak to how Philippine society develops with the 
ever changing physical environment. In an interview with Greg Bankoff, he explains how 
“some societies like the Philippines natural hazards occur with such historical frequency that 
the constant threat of them has been integrated the schema of daily life” to what he calls 
cultures of disaster (Curato and Corpus Ong, 2015, p. 208). A simple study of old and 
modern maps of the Philippines reveal how a several towns and villages have moved around 
over time to avoid anticipated perils from natural hazards such as, in the case of his example 
of Lake Taal, inland tsunamis and volcanic eruptions. The exposure to frequent hazards 
inevitable shape Philippine society, especially Indigenous Knowledges. 
  Setting the appropriate theoretical and methodological framework to examine 
Yolanda is a critical step. Disaster remains to be dynamic concept yet increasingly becoming 
a popular subject of inquiry especially at the age of climate change. From the 
conceptualization to the writing the research project, the dynamism of disaster as a concept 
and a phenomenon have required me to carefully study and evaluate several theories from 
various disciplines in order to find the framework that is not only the most adequate, but 
ultimately the one that will honour the stories and the analysis that the interviewees 
themselves advanced. Taking up the challenge posed by Curato and Corpus Ong, I place a 
crucial emphasis on the important insights of the disaster survivors themselves to 
convey  their perspectives on  disaster and Yolanda recovery.  
I find Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s work (2002) on decolonial methodologies particularly 
useful. She explains that a researcher’s choice of theory is important because it “contains 
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within it a method or methods for selecting and arranging, for prioritising what we see and 
do… and enables us to deal with contradictions and uncertainties. Perhaps more significantly, 
it gives us space to plan, to strategize, and to take greater control over our resistances” (p. 
38). Exploring the contradictions and uncertainties in particular contexts is a task I have taken 
up in this essay. If there is anything I have learned in my own journey as a researcher and 
community organizer, nothing is as simple as it seems. Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s classic and 
relevant work Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (1999), asserts 
how ‘research is “inextricably linked with European imperialism and colonialism” (p. 1). She 
traces this epistemological violence to the very conception of History itself, which is the story 
of a people who came to be known as Human, and in opposition to the Other/non-Human. 
Denise Ferierra Da Silva (2007) further argues that the Human vs non-Human binary is 
intrinsic to modern thought, and how the ontological differences assigned on non-humans 
mark the chronology of Human Time that starts with life and ends with death. I read the 
assignment of vulnerability and insecurity to bodies, as well as the assignment of zones of 
misrule (Bankoff, 2003) to developing nations, as ontological differences that largely trap 
subjects of disaster research along the horizon of death (Da Silva, 2007).  
 Reflecting on the currents within sociology and disaster studies, the editors of the 
special issue of the Philippine Sociological Review (2015) on the “Sociology of Disasters” 
ask: “have sociologists become part of the so-called Disaster Industrial Complex?” Noting 
how like journalists and humanitarian aid workers, sociologists “join the company of 
professionals that parachute in and out of disaster zones, either as part of professional 
responsibilities, sheer curiosity or genuine desire to help” (Curato and Corpus Ong, 2015, p. 
17). They call on researchers to reflect the role we play, whose interests are we serving and 
suggests two propositions for scholars: first, is to use sociological theory and methods to 
serve as “myth busters.” The proper use of empirical data can rectify oppressive assumptions 
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about disaster survivors. For example, as I mentioned earlier, one harmful assumption that 
certain population are vulnerable due to living in zones of misrule can be a task of critical 
researchers. Second, the editors ask “sociological disaster studies should also, in the end, 
serve the interest of the discipline itself” (p. 18). Citing Robert Stallings, he notes how “we 
[sociologists] have failed to consistently use disaster research to challenge and advance 
central theories and dominant paradigms in sociology… What we need to do, in other words, 
is to integrate insights from our research with the core concerns of the discipline” (2006, p. 
5). Taking up the challenge posed by Curato and Corpus Ong, I integrate the important 
insights of the disaster survivors themselves to guide me how I utilize to compile, write and 
present data. 
 
Methodology  
 The primary site of this inquiry is the Eastern Visayas Region in the Philippines. The 
selection criteria for the site are as follows: first, the site where the most affected populations 
by the typhoon are located; second, where international NGOs that have received funding 
from the Canadian government that operate; and third, where existing local NGOs and POs 
are engaged in typhoon response and recovery initiatives. Africa (2013) defines NGOs in 
reference to non-governmental non-profit orgs regardless of ideological orientation and 
funding resource. Meanwhile POs are membership-based organizations that advance a 
common interest along class or sectoral lines. 
I reviewed secondary sources to situate the humanitarian aid intervention within the 
three sites of interaction between Canada and the Philippines. First, I compiled a brief history 
of the Philippines, and the emergence of NGOs alongside the development of social 
movements and anti-colonial resistance. The geohistorical context in which the humanitarian 
aid intervention emerges from. Then, I examined academic and activist scholarship that 
discuss the relationship between Canadian foreign policy and international NGOs. A good 
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grasp of the debates on the role of NGOs allowed me to understand the operations of these 
organizations more comprehensively and dialectically. Third, I reviewed  relevant 
scholarship on the sociology of disaster. My aim was to  understand how history, institutions, 
political economy and discourses constitute disasters. 
I also conducted a critical discourse analysis of public statements and reports issued 
by the Government of Canada about what they called as the “humanitarian crisis in the 
Philippines.” As Foucault (1972) suggests that “nothing has any meaning outside of 
discourse,” and discourses are deeply imbued in power. I aim to reveal how typhoon Yolanda 
(Haiyan) is discursively constituted as a disaster and a crisis, and a specific discursive field. 
In this paper, I choose to use the Philippine name Yolanda. I intend to employ a method of 
discourse analysis that uses the “dialectical theory of discourse,” as Norman Fairclough 
(2001) proposes. This theory suggests that discourse has a dialectical relationship with “other 
elements of social practice.” I took illustrative (see Appendices B-H) photos during my 
fieldwork in the Philippines as a way of documenting and presenting the state of disaster 
relief and rehabilitation operations of the aftermath of typhoon Haiyan, recognizing 
that  most coverage is through the lens of military reports, NGOs and international media. 
I conducted in-depth interviews with NGO workers and PO organizers in Leyte, 
Eastern Visayas. All interviews were completed during during my month-long stay in the 
Philippines in April 2016. I spent time in Quezon City, where met with researchers of IBON 
Foundation, as well as PO organizers based in the capital region. Then, I went to the Leyte 
province. I was mostly based in Tacloban City, the most densely populated area in the region. 
The eye of the storm passed by area, leaving 90-95% of the city damaged (Win, 2013). I 
spent time at the Makabayan campaign office where I some members of People’s Surge, an 
alliance of disaster survivors in EV. I also conducted field visits in temporary and permanent 
shelter villages. I also visited Palo, a town right beside Tacloban City. I spent time with the 
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staff of the Leyte Centre for Development (LCDE) and the Eastern Visayas Rural Assistance 
Program (EVRAP). In Tanauan, I observed a community meetings conducted by People’s 
Surge. In Ormoc City, I visited the Makabayan campaign office and met members of 
Gabriela Women’s partylist, and Anakpawis, a worker-peasant partylist (see Appendix A). I 
initially proposed to interview a former employee from Plan Internationale, but I was not able 
to get a hold of her during my stay in the Philippines. I decided to interview a former 
employee of CARE Canada, which ended up being more appropriate as the areas where its 
projects were conducted were the towns I had access to. I conducted a five formal, semi-
structured interviews, with a total of eight individuals in Leyte. But my analysis is also built 
upon informal conversations with organizers, disaster survivors and from the forums and 
meetings I attended. 
 The inferences made in this paper draws from the triangulation of multiple data 
sources, thick description of accounts from research participants who convey multiple 
perspectives on humanitarian aid intervention and recovery in the context of the Yolanda 
disaster in Eastern Visayas. I used pseudonyms to protect research participant’ identity and 
confidentiality, except for the LCDE Executive Director, Minet Jerusalem.  
 
Structure of Paper 
 Following this introduction, this paper is divided into two three chapters. The first 
chapter situates Eastern Visayas within a larger historical, geographical and economic 
context. One of the poorest regions in the Philippines, Eastern Visayas is also a site of a 
dynamic social movement through the formation of NGOs and People’s Organizations (POs). 
The chapter locates the disaster and recovery efforts in the region within this frame. The 
second chapter focuses on the ways Canadian humanitarian interventions attempts to 
consolidate its pre-existing imperialist interests in the Philippines, namely the Philippines as: 
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the top source of immigrants since 2014; as a site of resource extraction operations; and as a 
country of geostrategic interests given Canada’s participation in the ‘global war on terror.’ 
The third chapter documents how, through the strong collaboration between local POs and 
NGOs, navigate the humanitarian aid industry during disaster recovery and rehabilitation 
efforts. I discuss the methods they employ to assert agency over foreign-funded projects and 
focus the priority towards local development and empowerment. I analyse how their strategic 
partnerships with iNGOs and even government units subvert neoliberal approaches to 
development that have historically characterized Canadian disaster response in less 
developed countries such as the Philippines. I conclude the paper with a discussion on the 
potential of the peace negotiations between the established state, the Republic of the 
Government of the Philippines (GRP) and the National Democratic Front (NDF) in boosting 
the efforts of local agents in disaster recovery and risk reduction in Eastern Visayas. I also 
discuss the lessons can the humanitarian aid industry draw from the methods of NGOs and 
POs in the Philippines employ, in order to effectively respond to and prevent future disasters 
from happening. 
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Chapter One – Situating Eastern Visayas  
Eastern Visayas 
 
In this section, I will give a geographical sketch, economic situation and a brief history of 
Eastern Visayas. This framing will situate the post-Yolanda humanitarian aid intervention 
and disaster recovery efforts in a political and historical context of the region. Eastern 
Visayas is an administrative region in the Philippines — Region VIII. Located in the central-
east section of the Philippines, it is composed of three main islands - Leyte, Samar and 
Biliran. The region faces the Pacific Ocean and covers an area of 21,562.9 square kilometers. 
Eastern Visayas has a flat terrain along the coast with mountainous areas in the interior of the 
two main islands, Samar and Leyte (Rappler.com, 2014). The Waray-waray people inhabit 
the majority of the region. In 1521, Ferdinand Magellan, a Portuguese sailor, ‘first-sighted’ 
Samar during a journey to the West in search of spices in the name of the Spanish Crown. He 
first arrived in Guiuan Island. 
Around 52% of Eastern Visayas is forestland. Mineral deposits in the region include 
chromite, nickel, clay, coal, limestone, pyrite, sand and gravel. It is surrounded by rich 
seawater and has an abundance of inland waters, a source of bountiful sea and freshwater 
fish. Eastern Visayas is mostly agricultural, with major crops of corn, coconut, palay [rice], 
sugarcane and banana (see Appendix B). Before Yolanda, it used to be the 2nd top producer of 
coconut in the country. The total population of the region is 3,880,148, with Tacloban City 
being the most densely populated town. The region is divided into six provinces, twelve 
districts, seven cities, one hundred and thirty six municipalities, and four thousand three 
hundred and ninety barangays. Each barangay is composed of a number of sitios (villages).  
The Philippines is ranked as one of the top five countries affected by natural disasters 
(Montenegro, 2015). It is considered one of the world’s natural hazard ‘hotspots,’ both 
geophysically and meteorologically (Holden, 2013). Situated along the Pacific ring of fire, 
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the country is home to many dormant and active volcanoes. The eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in 
1991, was the second largest volcanic eruption of the 20th century. Faint lindol (earthquakes) 
are experienced in the country at least five times a day (Holden, 2003). Tropical cyclones or 
bagyo, numbering 20 to 30 each year, most of which form over warm currents of the Pacific 
Ocean visit the islands between June and November. The archipelago has been dubbed the 
‘most storm-exposed country on Earth’ (Brown, 2013). Secondary hazards such as tsunamis 
and storm surges or tidal waves, which are caused by the influx of sea or lake water pushed 
by strong winds, usually result in storms. Active seismic activity has also made the region 
prone to frequent tsunamis. A storm surge in 1987 claimed up to 1,500 lives in Eastern 
Visayas (Holden, 2003). 
Before Yolanda, a strong typhoon and tidal wave reached Tacloban City, Leyte, in 
October 12, 1897. An archive of an Australian newspaper reported an “estimated that 400 
Europeans and 6000 natives lost their lives, many being drowned by the rush of water, while 
others were killed by the violence of the wind. Several towns have been swept or blown 
away”  (Luces, 2013). Another typhoon in 1912 left an estimated 15,000 people wounded and 
dead in Leyte and Capiz, a province in Western Visayas region.  
Before Yolanda struck Eastern Visayas, the region was the second poorest region in 
the Philippines, next to the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). It is now the 
poorest region in the Philippines (Jerusalem, personal communication, 2016; Fernandez 
2016). Citing a report released by the Philippine Statistical Authority, the economic output of 
the region declined due to damage caused by Typhoon Yolanda in 2013 and subsequent 
typhoons in 2014 (Fernandez, 2016). By 2016, the minimum wage in the entire region is 
P260 per day. But as Tala, an organizer with People’s Surge points out, it is only mostly in 
the cities where waged jobs exist. And even then, not all employers pay the full P260. 
“Pamasahe pa nga lang duon sa ibang manggagawa nauubos na ang pera nia. Paano ka pa 
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makapagipon. Kung kontraktwal din yan. [In transportation costs alone, their money is gone. 
What more for savings? The jobs are also mostly contractual]” (Tala,personal interview, 
2016).    
As in the rest of the archipelago, feudalism characterizes the economic and political 
condition of Eastern Visayas. The principal forces of production are the farmers who produce 
the majority of the agricultural output of the region on tracks of land owned by big landlords 
(Guerrero, 2005). In Samar alone, 40 landowning families own and control 50% of total 
agricultural land (Holden, 2013; Castañeda, 2005). While feudal relations between farmers 
and landlords have been identified as one of the key reasons for the continued 
impoverishment of majority of peasants in the Philippines, particularly in Eastern Visayas, 
land reform in the region has not materialized. The conditions of landless peasants are dire. 
From the interview with Marya and from my informal conversations with residents, many 
peasants are forced to work on sugarcane haciendas (plantations) for a meager P100-120 a 
day, "wala pa yong libreng pagkain [that does not include free food" (personal interview, 
2016). Many peasants who have land to toil struggled to bounce back after Yolanda. 
"Umuutang sila, naubos na ang paninda nila, pero wala paring kita [They borrow money, 
but even when they have sold all their yield, there is still no money left for them]" (Marya, 
personal interview, 2016). 
Eastern Visayas as a site of ongoing resistance 
 Given the sociopolitical sketch of Eastern Visayas in the previous section, I will 
outline here how the community works to respond to their material conditions. The 
discussion of resistance outlined here will frame the findings in the following chapters on 
community-based responses to Yolanda. Holden (2013) quotes De Belder and Vanobberghen 
(1999, p. 89) acknowledging, “as one of the poorest regions of the Philippines, Samar has 
been one of the bulwarks of the Philippine revolution”. The Communist Party of the 
 29 
Philippines (CPP) nationwide ’genuine land reform agenda’ seeks to “increase tenants’ share 
in production,” a major difference from the government’s Comprehensive Agrarian Reform 
Program which “aims to redistribute land” (Santos and Santos, 2010, p. 48). Indeed, this 
platform, as CPP claims, has succeeded in “cultivating deep roots in the countryside,” where 
peasants themselves make up majority of the NPA fighters (Ang Bayan, 2013).  
 Since 2001, suspected members and supporters of the NPA have been targets of 
assassination by the AFP (Holden, 2013). The series of counterinsurgency programs dubbed 
Samar as a ‘killing field’ due to relatively high rates of extrajudicial killings, military 
harassment, forced disappearances, and illegal arrests (Carceller, 2000; Holden, 2014). In 
2005, many community organizers were victims of extrajudicial killings and forced 
disappearances perpetrated under AFP General Jovito Palparan’s leadership (Marya, personal 
interview, 2016; Holden, 2013).  Referred to as the "Palparan era," 2005 marked the height of 
the violence against the civilian population (Acosta, 2011; Holden, 2013). In Eastern 
Visayas, disaster workers and leaders of People’s Organizations (POs), are also victims of 
extrajudicial killings post-Yolanda. The armed conflict in the region and its impacts to 
communities were extremely evident, making it imperative to examine how the 
counterinsurgency program in Eastern Visayas effected disaster recovery efforts.  
 Palparan’s service in the military was known to head the special Philippine envoy in 
Iraq from 2003 to 2004. Former political prisoner Ericson Acosta regards the assignment of 
Palparan, infamously known as "the butcher" as part of the Oplan Bantay Laya II (Operation 
Freedom Watch II), the counterinsurgency program during the Arroyo regime (Acosta, 
2011). Its first incarnation, Operation Freedom Watch I, was launched by the Philippine 
government as part of the U.S.-initiated global “War on Terror.” According to Lucas and 
Shahshahani (2014), the counterinsurgency program “made no distinction between armed 
combatants and civilians.” Between February 28 - April 20, 2005, as the chief of 8th  Infantry 
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Division in Samar and Leyte, Palparan was linked to the murder of five people, two frustrated 
murders, five abductions, five harassments, two incidents of destruction of property, five 
illegal arrests, four aerial bombings, and a food blockade (Santos and Santos, 2010). Hustisya 
(2014), a human rights organization reported up to nine victims of extrajudicial killings, 
twelve victims of enforced disappearances and twenty-five victims of torture between 
February and August 2005. Furthermore, Palparan’s victims are leaders and member of POs 
labelled as fronts of the NPA. Unfortunately, the extrajudicial killings and forced 
disappearances did not cease after Palparan was assigned to another region. The atrocities of 
the counterinsurgency program from Arroyo's time continued and intensified under her 
successor, Ninoy Aquino III (Teodro, 2014, xiii). Yolanda survivors and organizers involved 
in disaster recovery work were thus amongst the victims of the new counterinsurgency 
program, Oplan Bayanihan.  
 According to key informants, POs, specifically farmers associations and NGOs, such 
as organizations under the Citizen Disaster Response Network (CDRN), have been targets of 
the counterinsurgency operations. LCDE is a development local NGO that conducts disaster 
recovery work in Eastern Visayas. One of their activities is to conduct ‘Disaster 
Preparedness’ trainings with POs in the region. In LCDE’s training, military threat is 
included by the communities themselves as a human-induced hazard, especially in upland 
areas. “Even yesterday, a PO in a barangay texted me and said there is military in our 
community and asking individuals that we have a list of names that this persons are allegedly 
involved in the communists. But actually they’re not, because they’re just farmers” 
(Makaryo, personal interview, 2016). The residents report that the military does not allow 
them to go to their farms. “They are labelled as supporting the rebels, the NPA.” An 
evacuation plan to a neighbouring barangay or municipality is part of the counter-disaster 
plan in the event of military threat or encounter. The interviewees used the term “red-
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tagging” to describe the behaviour of military in accusing organizers and NGO workers as 
part of the NPA. LCDE works with the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) and 
Katungod, a local human rights organization, to monitor human rights violations perpetrated 
by the military. Makaryo and Perla, two of the LCDE staff who conduct the Disaster 
Preparedness training in the region point out: 
Makaryo: Sometimes they [ICRC and Katungod] are also red-tagged! 
Perla: Even us! 
Makaryo: Most of the time we approach ICRC, because last year, November and December, 
we have our former beneficiary, taken to the camp of the military because they are the 
accused as supporters. We approached ICRC and they went to the camp. They got to person 
back to the farm. No warrant. Just on their list. 
Perla: They just picked them up, no due process.  
 
Based from the formal integration of NGOs in the counterinsurgency operations, PO 
organizers are weary of the NGO presence in the region. Furthermore, IBON foundation 
notes the large number of NGOs, local and international, that functioned as “charity or 
service providers” during the emergency and recovery stages in the aftermath of Yolanda, 
that tend to “undermine accumulated social capital and painstaking community organizing 
and politicization efforts” (2015, p. 7). At a community forum where Tala was invited to 
conduct a voters’ education training, a number of representatives from NGOs involved in 
disaster recovery projects spoke and asked residents to help them create profiles of different 
areas. The inquiries included information such as population, number of houses, etc. But one 
question that struck her the most is “may mga NPA ba dito? [Are there NPA forces here?]” 
(Tala, personal interview, 2016). 
It appears that during the rehabilitation stage, the military required security clearances 
to all organizations who were delivering goods to typhoon-struck areas. In doing so, the 
military was preventing ‘red-tagged’ organization, which they are themselves composed of 
residence and survivors of Yolanda (Teodro, xii, 2013). The organizations concerned with 
development and disaster response under the CDRN, “were fast becoming targets of military 
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harassments illegal arrest and killings" (Lacorte, 2013 p.17). BALSA Mindanao, a 
development organization based in Mindanao, was in the region after Yolanda to lend 
support in conducting recovery projects (see Appendix D). According to the IBON 
Foundation (2015), the group was questioned by the Local Government Unit on their choice 
of villages to supply with relief goods. Delivering relief goods to remote areas was suspected 
as collaborating with the NPA. There are many documented killings, military harassments 
and illegal arrest of disaster and development workers, not only in Eastern Visayas, but 
across other regions in the Philippines. In the view of  Marya, a peasant organizer, PO 
members in Albuera were not informed by barangay officials that there was relief to be 
delivered in the area. They were told that they can only receive “kung may sobra [if there was 
extra]” (Marya, personal interview, 2016). 
Based on public records and community accounts, Jefferson Custodio, a 25 year old 
LCDE volunteer, was murdered in August 22, 2014. Custodio volunteered as a bantay 
[guard] of the warehouse where relief goods were stored and helped LCDE in identifying 
beneficiaries of projects (Lydia, personal interview, 2016). He was shot by alleged military 
elements of the 19th Infantry Battalion of the AFP while delivering donated farm tools to 
upland communities in Carigara (Manila Today, 2014). His father was an officer of 
Municipal Farmers Association of Carigara at that time (Lydia, personal interview, 2016). 
Known to people as Jeff, he was victim to a “series of harassment and threats he received 
from the Military Intelligence Group and the 19th Infantry Battalion” (Manila Today, 2014). 
But Custodio’s case is not the only extrajudicial killing that occurred in the aftermath of 
Yolanda. Just a few months before Custodio’s death, PO leader Rodolfo Basada was killed 
on June 29 in Pinabacdao, Samar. Then on September 1, 2014, Nelson Mercader, a town 
councilor of Las Navas, Northern Samar was also murdered. A week before I arrived in 
Leyte, a mayoral candidate's assistant was killed by a masked individual on the side of a 
 33 
highway in broad daylight. Community members suspect that the mayoral candidate is a 
target of military harassment, as he agreed to sign the People's Agenda that People's Surge 
was presenting to candidates during the 2016 Elections. During the campaign period, 
People’s Surge was also actively engaging its members through providing voters education 
workshops (see Appendix E) 
 Residents of Tacloban in fact, report that the first sign of national government 
presence was when the military and police forces were deployed to respond to the looting 
happening in neighbourhoods (IBON, 2015, p. 63). The military was also present to provide 
security for businesses from prisoners who broke out of jail during the typhoon. Residents 
also noticed that foreign military personnel outnumbered local military in the disaster struck 
areas. As part of the U.S. directed Oplan Damayan, 13,000 US troops were stationed in 
Eastern Visayas to support emergency and rehabilitation efforts, and 6,250 more in the Gulf 
of Leyte. There were also military forces from Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, 
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Brunei, Thailand and New Zealand. The aftermath of 
Typhoon Yolanda was known to be the most militarized disaster response in the Philippines. 
To this day, red-tagged PO organizers and NGO workers are prevented from entering some 
of the upland areas to conduct disaster recovery work. Marya, a PO organizer and Artemio, 
an NGO worker, shared that some barangays have a CCTV set up by the military to surveil 
communities. They both shared that militarization makes it difficult for upland communities 
to self-organize (personal interview, 2016). 
The research findings exposed the intense militarization in Eastern Visayas during 
disaster recovery, where development workers and volunteers themselves are targets of 
military harassment. Prior to Typhoon Yolanda, the counterinsurgency program forced POs 
to become inactive or abandon their Indigenous practices, specifically communal farming. 
State attacks function to stifle locally-initiated efforts which address the root causes of the 
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community’s vulnerability to disasters. Military harassment also functions as a barrier for 
communities to have the proper level of organization required for a Disaster Response 
Committee, which is discussed in more detail in Chapter three. However, the residents of 
Eastern Visayas, through their local NGOs, are unable to conduct their disaster recovery 
work without becoming collateral damage in the government counterinsurgency program. In 
spite of unceasing cases of extrajudicial killings and military harassment, the people of 
Eastern Visayas continue to organize and support other communities to re-start POs. The case 
of Eastern Visayas also illuminates the multiple forms of recovery, community agency, and 
recovery mechanisms through the collective spirit of bayanihan. 
 The complexity of causes of vulnerability is apparent in the approaches of POs and 
local NGOs to recovery where community efforts to address the root causes of their 
vulnerability make them targets of the counterinsurgency program. Because POs and NGOs 
inevitably have to be critical of the ineffective band-aid approaches of the national 
government, they are in turn, branded as supporters of the CPP-NPA. Despite the risks that 
organizers, NGO workers and even human rights advocates face amidst intense ‘red-tagging,’ 
they continue to jointly conduct disaster recovery work in the region. One of the PO 
organizers I interviewed, Nanay Lydia, shared that she wanted to continue the work that 
Jefferson Custodio did in his honour. While the extrajudicial killings and military 
harassments were intended to “dismantling the political backbone of the place or left-wing 
sympathies” (Tingcungco, 2014), many instead reaffirm their commitment to continue 
organizing. Yolanda showed the harsh reality that the prolonged persistence of feudalism and 
landlessness have contributed to the death of almost 18,000 people in the region. For many 
organizers and NGO workers, they have accepted the unfortunate possibility of their names 
being added to the long list of EJK’s in the Philippines, resolved with the faith that, one day, 
their work will prevent future disasters from happening.  
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 As shown in the inquiry, recovery in the context of EV was not limited to the 
aftermath of Yolanda. It was the interviewees themselves who began to discuss recovery 
from the impacts of counterinsurgency. For them, recovery from the supertyphoon was not 
separate from reorganizing their respective communities and returning to their traditional 
means of livelihood. Tiklos is practiced in all scales of recovery — from the practice of 
communal farming, to the collaborations between POs, NGOs, iNGOs, and human rights 
organizations. The methods of disaster recovery that have been applied and developed in the 
particular context of Eastern Visayas are becoming entrenched in their culture. Following 
Bankoff’s (2004) concept of cultures of disaster, the comprehensive and complex web of 
networks that are involved in disaster recovery work in the region is part of that culture.  
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Chapter Two – Affect of Benevolence: Humanitarianism as consolidating 
and subverting Canadian imperialism 
 
On April 4, 2014, Christian Paradis the Minister of International Development and La 
Francophonie issued a statement entitled, “Statement by Minister Paradis on Canadians' 
donations of more than $85 million to Typhoon Haiyan relief efforts” (DFATD, 2014). The 
statement was issued four months after Typhoon Yolanda struck the Philippines. The 
statement opened by calling Typhoon Yolanda a “tragedy of unimaginable proportions, even 
for a country accustomed to dealing with tropical storms.” Altruism through humanitarian 
intervention is central to Canadian national identity (Razack, 2007). Paradis expressed pride, 
“as a Canadian” himself, of “our response to the typhoon” (DFATD, 2014). He is referring to 
the ‘Typhoon Haiyan Relief Fund’ launched by the Government of Canada one day after 
Yolanda hit the Philippines. Through the Fund, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Development pledged to match all individual donations to registered Canadian charities 
involved in Yolanda relief efforts. The fundraising initiatives, described as “collective 
efforts,” were nation-building exercises that made a “difference to the lives of Filipinos” 
(DFATD, 2014). The Fund was distributed to government-selected iNGOs, many of which 
were part of the Devonshire Initiative (DI), a consortium of mining companies and 
development iNGOs.  
There has been a large critique of Canadian humanitarian interventions around the 
world, most recently the post-earthquake interventions in Haiti as well as peacekeeping 
efforts in Somalia (Razack, 2007) and in Afghanistan (Albo, 2014). The contradictions of 
Canadian humanitarianism have compelled me to examine Canadian humanitarian 
intervention in the Philippines in the aftermath of Typhoon Yolanda. Canada’s history with 
the Philippines pre-existed before Yolanda, and certainly not limited to humanitarian aid. 
First, the Philippines has been Canada’s top source of migrant labour since 2014 
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(Government of Canada, 2014). Second, there is a significant flow of Canadian capital to the 
Philippines, most of which is through mining operations (Holden and Jacobson, 2012). Third, 
the Philippines a site of Canadian military interest particularly in the era of ‘Global War on 
Terror.’ This geohistorical context that Philippine-Canadian relations are situated in compel 
to ask if humanitarian iNGOs function as what Harvey (2009) describe as the ‘trojan horses’ 
of imperialism. 
 In this chapter, I interrogate how Canadian humanitarian aid intervention in the 
aftermath of Typhoon Yolanda in the Philippines consolidates processes of labour migration, 
resource extraction and military cooperation. The chapter, drawing from the multiple data 
sources, will convey perspectives on Canadian humanitarian intervention. It will be divided 
into four sub-sections: first, I situate temporary measures to expedite migration applications 
to Canada from typhoon-struck areas within a longer history of Philippine labour migration to 
Canada. I briefly discuss how neoliberal approaches to development have encouraged the 
out-migration of Filipinos as workers vis-a-vis the absence of national industries that can 
absorb the country’s workforce. Foreign-owned companies dominate one of the major 
industries in the Philippines — resource extraction. The Canadian-owned mining industry has 
placed Canada as the top foreign country in the Philippines with the highest number of 
mining tenements and largest cumulative tenement area. This has resulted in an ever-growing 
opposition against foreign-owned large-scale mining operations, which at times expressed as 
military offensive attacks from the New People’s Army (NPA), the armed wing of the 
Communist Party of the Philippines. Third, I discuss Canada’s strategic military interests on 
the Philippines with the intention of protecting its investments in the country. The 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Philippines and Canada is analysed 
within Canada specific interest in advancing the counterinsurgency program against the NPA. 
NGOs and iNGOs have been formalized as partners of Canadian mining companies and the  
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counterinsurgency program, Oplan Bayanihan, and the Devonshire Initiative (DI), a 
consortium between mining companies and iNGOs. However, I argue that while iNGOs and 
NGOs could serve to advance neoliberalism during disasters, local NGOs and people’s 
organizations (POs) have employed strategies to navigate the contradictions of the 
humanitarian aid industry. In the last section, I trace the emergence of a faction of 
‘progressive’ local NGOs from the long history of anti-imperialist and pro-national 
sovereignty movements in the Philippines (Africa, 2013). While sharing the popular 
sentiment against neoliberal approaches to development, the informants I interviewed 
revealed how local NGOs in Eastern Visayas have collaborated with CARE International - a 
Canadian-funded iNGO which is also a member of DI. Through centering the role of POs as 
active actors in disaster recovery, local NGOs have found ways to not only utilize Canadian 
humanitarian aid towards disaster recovery, but also to strengthen self-reliance and stimulate 
local economies. Through strong partnerships between local NGOs and POs, disaster 
survivors at the Eastern Visayas region are subverting the consolidation of Canadian 
imperialism in the aftermath of the Haiyan disaster. 
Labour migration 
 On November 13, 2016, the federal government announced that Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada would “prioritize the processing of applications on request from 
Filipinos who were significantly and personally affected by Typhoon Haiyan” (DFATD, 
2015). It was reported that as of April 1, 2014, there were 245 applications to the Temporary 
Foreign Workers Program (TFWP), including the Live-in Caregiver Program (LCP), and 852 
for Permanent Resident applications, which includes family sponsorship from workers who 
completed the requirement of the LCP. Immigration advocates have questioned if the 
‘facilitative measure’ was used by the Canadian government, then under Harper, as a 
publicity stunt (Dempsey, 2014). Filipino activist groups in Canada contend that the measure 
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is intended to expand and justify TFWP and LCP. Both programs hire foreign labour mostly 
from LCDs to perform various jobs deemed unfillable by the Canadian population under 
precarious working conditions. The promise to expedite applications occurred in the midst of 
the same government adding restrictions on temporary foreign workers to be eligible for 
permanent residency.   
Labour migration, specifically the migration of Filipinas as domestic workers in 
Canada, has been well documented. Macklin (1992) traces the history of domestic work in 
Canada from the early 1800s, following the importation of immigrants from "non-preferred 
nations” such as Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Hungary to work as servants for 
upper and middle class British women. Macklin, and also Agnes Calliste (1989) document 
the shift of the importation of domestic workers from the Global South between 1910 and 
1966, particularly from the Caribbean. Macklin continues to document this transformation in 
the movement from of the Foreign Domestic Schemes to the Live-in Caregiver Program 
(LCP). Furthermore, Stasiulis and Bakan (2005) identify the following main political, 
economic and cultural conditions that changed the primary source of domestic workers from 
the Caribbean to the Philippines: the strength of the militant feminist organizing of Caribbean 
domestic workers; anti-Black racism on the part of employment agencies; and the 
formalization of the Labour Export Policy in the Philippines as one of the World Bank-
imposed Structural Adjustment Policies. More recent academics researching the LCP focus 
on the impacts of the program to families and the community. Roselyn Salvador’s thesis 
(2015) explores the reconfiguration of elder care in the Philippines whose care is financed by 
remittances of caregivers in Victoria, BC. Meanwhile, Pratt (2012) documents the 
ramifications of the LCP to children through prolonged the family separation, as well the 
reunification that mediated by the unique to the phenomenon of Filipina labour migration. 
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Presenting TFWP and LCP as a viable option to escape the aftermath of the disaster is 
consistent with the logics behind the Labour Export Policy (LEP) of the Philippines. Passed 
during the Marcos era, LEP intensified the out-migration of Filipinos all over the world, as 
the policy restructured the Philippines into a labour brokerage state that "actively prepares, 
mobilizes, and regulates its citizens for migrant work abroad” (Rodriguez, 2010, p. 1). The 
LEP is praised as sagot sa kahirapan [a solution to poverty], as remittances from over 10 
million Filipinos working abroad keep the economy afloat. The LEP has also been criticized 
as a measure to quell social unrest and as a counterinsurgency strategy (Gonzalez, 2004; 
Rodriguez, 2010). Regardless, Haiyan’s significant impact on people's livelihood made 
migration to Canada an even more desirable option (Dempsey, 2014), given the high rates of 
unemployment and underemployment in the Philippines. 
Resource Extraction 
 In the Philippines, Canada is not only known for the ‘land with greener pastures.’ It is 
also known for its expansive mining operations in the Philippines. The lack of stable 
livelihood has been linked to the stifled national industry due to the hegemony of foreign-
owned industries in the Philippines (Guerrero, 2005; Rodriguez, 2010; IBON Foundation, 
2014). Resource extraction is an industry largely dominated by foreign companies. The 
passage of the Mining Act of 1995 allowed for full foreign ownership over projects, legalized 
displacement of communities in mining sites, and granting of access to water and timber-
rights  (Rural Missionaries of the Philippines, 2014; Holden, 2015). The resource extraction 
industry can be located within the mining-based development paradigm that the Philippine 
state deploys. Academics, environmental advocates, local NGOs and POs assert that the 
Mining Act is unconstitutional, and have sustained a campaign to revoke it (Rural 
Missionaries of the Philippines, 2014).  
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 Holden and Jacobson (2012) reveal the one of the contradictions of the mining-based 
development paradigm by exposing how large-scale mining intensifies the impact of natural 
hazards an already disaster-prone country. The instability of mining tailings dams from heavy 
rainfall is identified as the main risk posed by typhoons, exemplified by the 1996 Marcopper 
spillage in Marinduque and the Philex Mining Corporation 2012 spill in Benguet (IBON, 
2012). Marcopper Mining and Philex Mining Corporation are fully and partly Canadian-
owned. Despite massive opposition to the Mining Act and the well-documented 
environmental impacts of large-scale foreign mining operations, the Philippines’ neoliberal 
approach to development continues to open up the country to more foreign-operated resource 
extraction projects.  
As of May 2014, Canadian-owned companies, both fully and partially, made Canada 
the top foreign country in the Philippines with the highest number of mining tenements 
(operational or not), at 19 tenements (IBON Foundation, 2015). Canada also has the largest 
cumulative tenement area, at 62,660 hectares (IBON Foundation, 2015). Canada’s economic 
and political investment in the continuation of  the Philippines Mining Act of 1995 cannot be 
denied. As a result of typhoon Yolanda, two Canadian resource extraction companies 
incurred damages to infrastructure. Glencore Xstrata that operates the PASAR (Philippine 
Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation) plant— a copper smelter and refinery in 
Isabela, Leyte, incurred “heavy structural damage” from Yolanda. The company has donated 
US$2 million in funds through the Pasar Foundation (Tarikh, 2013; Glexcore Xstrata, 2013), 
the CSR arm of the PASAR plant (Glexcore Xstrata, 2013; IBON Foundation, 2015). 
Mindoro Resources Ltd site in Panay, west of Eastern Visayas, incurred some damages to 
camp facilities from typhoon Yolanda (Mindoro Resources Ltd, 2013). The company is in a 
joint venture on nickel mining with TVI Pacific, a Canadian mining company. TVI Pacific 
currently has mining exploration applications over the largest surface area in the Philippines. 
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The location of the Mindoro / TVI Pacific Agata Project in located in the province of Agusan 
del Norte, a province in Mindanao also incurred damages, mainly to roads. Both TVI Pacific 
and Mindoro Resources Ltd conducted disaster relief operations in the area post-Yolanda. 
Canadian mining companies, such as OceanaGold, B2Gold, Besra Gold, BHP Billiton, and 
Canpotex are reported to have donated funds towards disaster recovery efforts (Tarikh, 2013; 
IBON Foundation, 2015). 
 While the No Dwelling Zone (NDZ) policy has prohibited communities to return to 
their homes by the shore, mining companies are still allowed to operate (Tala, personal 
interview, 2016). In the town of MacArthur, Leyte, RT Mining Corp has a black sand mining 
operation (Salarda, 2014). RT Mining Corp has been linked to RT Minerals Corp, a 
Canadian-based company. “Simula sa MacArthur pero pinatigil sa pagpprotesta ng mga 
mamamayan [It started at MacArthur, but it was stopped due to people’s protest],” explains 
Tala (personal interview, 2016). 
Mining operations in the Philippines escalate the conflict between the Armed Forces 
of the Philippines (AFP) and the armed wing of the CPP, the New People’s Army (NPA). 
Holden and Jacobson, quoting 2007 reports from the United States Army and United States 
Marine Corps, identify that the threats large-scale mining poses to the “poor and 
marginalized” have acted as a “grievance mechanism” that “drives people to the NPA” 
(2012, p. 205). They note the increased militarization of mountainous regions of the 
Philippines where most NPA base areas are located, where Indigenous peoples live, and 
where large-scale mining corporations operate. Many of these mining companies are mostly 
either Australian or Canadian, and hire their own paramilitary groups to support the 
counterinsurgency efforts of the AFP. The NPA has launched various tactical offensives 
against large-scale mining companies all throughout the country, some of which are 
Canadian-owned (Holden and Jacobson, 2012; IBON Foundation, 2015). Lumads, the 
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Indigenous peoples of Mindanao, declared a pangayaw [tribal war] against firms encroaching 
on their ancestral domains (IBON Foundation, 2015; Rural Missionaries of the Philippines, 
2014). In Eastern Visayas, the NPA has gained considerable strength that they were 
reportedly able to demand ‘revolutionary taxes’ from mining companies (Holden, 2013). 
 The current counterinsurgency program in the Philippines, Oplan Bayanihan, 
incorporated ‘peace and development programs’ as an effective approach to undercut support 
for the NPA. In a public forum in Toronto on November 7, 2015, members of Cordillera 
Peoples’ Alliance (CPA), an Indigenous alliance from Luzon, identify how the approach of 
Oplan Bayanihan compliments that of the Devonshire Initiative (DI). DI is a consortium of 
Canadian mining companies and iNGOs that allows the creation of formalized networks 
between the two seemingly incompatible industries, under the banner of international 
development. CPA contends that similar to local NGOs, iNGOs serve communities 
surrounding mining sites to temporarily mitigate the brutal impacts of resource extraction, as 
well as increase surveillance to prevent the NPA from conducting agitation work and 
community programs. Eligible donations to Canada’s Typhoon Haiyan fund had to be made 
to charities that are registered with the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA). Annual financial 
audits, general meetings, submission of the names of board members are only a few of the 
several requirements that organizations have to fulfill to be registered with CRA. Meanwhile, 
the matched donation from the Government allocated it to “experienced Canadian and 
international organizations responding to the crisis.” Many of the “experienced” iNGOs that 
Canada distributed the funds to are members of the Devonshire Initiative, such as World 
Vision, Plan Canada and Care Canada.  
Militarization and the role of NGOs 
 The on-going civil war between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines 
(GRP) and the NPA and its threat to foreign investments in the Philippines have made the 
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country a site of geostrategic relevance to the world. Recently named as one the most 
disaster-prone countries in the world, scholars have emphasized that an examination of 
disasters in the Philippines must exercise important consideration of on-going armed conflicts 
(Bankoff, 2003; Holden, 2011; Walch, 2014; Holden and Jacobson, 2012). More Developed 
Countries such as Canada and the US are invested in the defeat of the NPA, as the Party’s 
pro-nationalist platform aims to severely limit foreign-owned operations in the country.  
With the onslaught of the US-led ‘Global War on Terror,’ the US and Canada added 
the NPA to their respective ‘terrorist’ lists, consolidating both countries’ security and military 
support for Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). The GRP has a long-
standing Mutual Defense Treaty with the US, strengthened via the recent passing of the 
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) in 2014. Meanwhile, a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) between Canada and the Philippines formalizes the ‘defense training 
cooperation program’ between the two countries. One of the stated objectives of both the 
MoU and EDCA is to improve disaster response support from Canadian and US military 
forces. But People’s Surge, an alliance of disaster survivors in Eastern Visayas, “express 
anger of the use of their pain to expedite the passage of EDCA” (Tala, personal interview, 
2016). 
 The EDCA was signed in April 28, 2014, only several months after Yolanda. An 
agreement between US President Barack Obama, and the Aquino government, supporters of 
EDCA argue that no senate approval was needed because it merely serves as an 
“enhancement” of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and the Philippines. 
Meanwhile, several NGOs, government officials, academics argue that EDCA legalizes the 
restoration of US bases in the Philippines and threatens Philippine national sovereignty. 
Organizers from People’s Surge and journalists are concerned that Yolanda was used to 
expedite the passing of EDCA (Salamat 2014; Tala, personal interview, 2016; IBON, 2015), 
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raising suspicion around the inclusion of “desiring enhance the cooperative capacities in 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief” as one of the aims of EDCA. Women rights 
groups like Gabriela and the Centre for Women’s Resource contend that EDCA will only 
increase the frequency of violence against women perpetrated by US military troops, 
referring to the recent killing of transwoman Jennifer Laude by US Marine Joseph Scott 
Pemberton (Centre for Women’s Resources, 2014). 
 EDCA was to further involve the US military, with the support of the Canadian state, 
in the counterinsurgency program against the CPP-NPA-NDF. While the Philippine Liberal 
Party was in power, a formal alliance was made with Akbayan Party which was formed by 
various NGO leaders. The alliance between the established state and reformist NGOs 
culminated in a new version of the counterinsurgency program called Oplan Bayanihan 
[Operation Community Unity]. One key feature of the program is a “People-Centered 
Security/Human Security Approach” which tasks the AFP to “maximize the utilization of 
non-combat operations such as civil-military operations (CMO) and development-oriented 
activities” (AFP, 2011). In a presentation in 2013, Satur Ocampo explained how Oplan 
Bayanihan “establishes a direct correlation or kinship with the 2009 U.S. Counterinsurgency 
Guide.” Also called the ‘COIN guide,’ this document was issued in 2009 jointly by the then 
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and USAID 
Administrator Henrietta Fore to guide the US counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Civil Society Organizations (CSO) are outlined as partners in implementing 
community development programs in armed conflict areas. Such approach is a departure 
from the previous administration's all-out military offensive strategy against the NPA. The 
World Bank donated $216 million towards the implementation of community programs. 
International NGOs were one of the largest contributors of emergency funding used in relief 
and rehabilitation in Eastern Visayas, the region that suffered the most damage from the 
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disaster (IBON, 2015). Now the poorest region in the Philippines, scholars and activists have 
argued that Yolanda must be recognized as not a unique ‘event,’ but rather as a continuation 
of the socio-economic and political conditions of the region (Porteria, 2015). An examination 
of the operations of international and local NGOs in the region reveals how humanitarian aid 
can not only stop the consolidation, but in fact subvert, Canadian imperialist presence. 
Disaster rehabilitation and recovery, most especially in Less Developed Countries 
(LCDs), have been critiqued as a process that further consolidates the neoliberalization of 
economies (Klein, 2007; Barry-Shaw and Jay, 2012; Porteria, 2015). Recovery initiatives 
have mobilized international communities, from the level of state, CSOs and ordinary 
citizens to respond to the needs of disaster survivors. International aid, in the form of 
funding, direct provision of services, or donation of goods, have been used as political tools. 
Hatem Bazian argues that humanitarian aid is part of a larger project of “outside interests 
attempting to shape a liberation struggle in a way that supports imperial forces” (Smith, 2007, 
p. 176).  
Canada, known for its generosity in providing humanitarian aid to several LCDs 
around the world, has been the subject of criticism for its use of humanitarian aid to advance 
its economic and political interests in different parts of the world such as Haiti. Scholar-
activists Barry-Shaw and Jay (2012) extensively document literature critiquing “Canada’s 
foundational myth of international benevolence” that NGOs have come to epitomize (p. 1). 
Canada’s intentions behind international humanitarian aid, they argue, has multiple functions 
that they illustrate using various examples documented in the literature. Mike Davis, a 
prominent Marxist geographer whose work Barry-Shaw and Jay draw upon, notes that local 
NGOs, with the support of international NGOs, “have proven brilliant at co-opting local 
leadership as well as hegemonizing the social space traditionally occupied by the Left” 
(Barry-Shaw and Jay , 2006, p. 76).  
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In the Philippines, not all CSOs are ‘co-opted’ contrary to Davis’ (2006) thesis. In 
fact, the country has a dynamic and rich history of CSOs that developed through waves social 
movements (Africa, 2013; Bourdeau, 2004). While international and local CSOs have been 
argued to be extensions of imperialist interventions in LCDs,  the emergence of ‘progressive’ 
CSOs in the Philippines have become a significant force in opposition to neoliberalization. 
These CSOs, many of them conduct disaster relief and recovery projects, have been the 
targets of counterinsurgency operations of the state. 
Africa (2013) traces the history of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and their dual 
character in relation to social movements in the Philippines. The first community-oriented 
development NGOs, which were under influence of American Jesuits and anti-communist in 
character, were set up in Communist-influence areas in Central Luzon and in two other 
neighbouring regions. These organizations provided basic services such as health and 
education and to undermine the community engagement of the armed struggle. Despite the 
efforts to counter the National Democratic (ND) movement through CSOs, the movement 
gained further strength with the reestablishment of the Communist Party of the Philippines in 
1968 (Guerrero, 2005). A party of a ‘new type’ adapted the Mao-Tsetung thought and 
adapted the strategy of ‘protracted people’s war’ (Africa, 2013) to advance an anti-
imperialist, national democratic revolution. The sustained strength of the revolutionary 
movement, with a more consolidated armed wing called the New People’s Army (NPA), and 
the alliance of sector-based organizations, the National Democratic Front (NDF) started to 
destabilize the status quo. 
In response to the strengthening of National Democratic forces all over the country, 
President Marcos declared the country under Martial Law in 1972, and NDF organizations 
were outlawed. During the Martial Law era, which lasted until 1986, the first formal Internal 
Security Plan was launched, Oplan Katatagan [Operation Strength]. The operations of the 
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counterinsurgency program in the countryside, where NPA forces are concentrated, 
intensified (Bourdeau, 2004). A subsection of NGOs then emerged, who distinguished 
themselves from most NGOs that were welfare-oriented and non-activist in nature. Boudreau 
(2004) characterizes these CSOs as “open and semi-legal anti-dictatorship organizations” (p. 
176). While these new NGOs implemented development-oriented and welfare projects, they 
also organized alongside POs against the fascist Marcos regime.  Africa (2013) defines 
NGOs in reference to non-governmental non-profit orgs regardless of ideological orientation 
and funding resource. Meanwhile POs are membership-based organizations that advance a 
common interest along class or sectoral lines. While the NGO sector in the Philippines is 
relatively large compared to other countries, only a minority of organizations are actively 
engaged with POs. These left-leaning NGOs and POs situated themselves within a larger 
struggle of social transformation which “injected an activist dynamism and degree of 
counter-hegemonic ideology unto generally conservative civil-society and the public in 
general” (Africa, 2013, p. 120). Marcos then, also targeted state repression towards legal 
formations and civilian organizers, citing the deaths of several activists during a protest in 
1983, as well as the military’s harassment and intimidation of organizations (Boudreau, 
2004). Meanwhile, the AFP’s Home Defense Program “carried out literacy projects and 
livelihood programs” to win over NPA’s mass base (Hernandez, 2006).  The 1986 People 
Power uprising, which ousted Marcos and brought the liberal Aquino government to power, 
caused a split among the left forces. On one side were people who upheld that NGOs and 
POs must work towards the advancement of a national democratic revolution and saw the 
regime change as merely a continuation of a ‘puppet government’ that supports US 
dominance over Philippine sovereignty. The other side considered the end of the fascist 
regime as a signal of the nation’s transformation towards democracy, in which they resolved 
to engage with the government to slowly implement reforms. The post-Marcos government 
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began to lay the foundation for a framework for “NGOs to engage and participate in, rather 
than contest the state” (Africa, 2013, p. 121). The global trend towards utilizing NGOs as a 
force in implementing development programs was reflected in the foreign policies of the UN 
and international financial institutions. In particular the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank administered aid through funding CSOs that implemented “poverty 
reduction programs” (Africa, 2013). Since the late 1980s to the present, foreign agencies 
remain to be the primary funders of Philippine NGOs (Africa, 2013). Subsequent post-
Marcos administrations continued to establish frameworks for NGOs to participate in 
governance at different levels. For example NGOs and POs that are given positions in 
education, law enforcement, and health boards are offered avenues to participate in 
governance. Despite the deliberate inclusion of NGOs in governance, ‘left’ NGOs continued 
to face repression. The end of the open repression era during the Marcos dictatorship 
translated to an increase of subversive methods such as “dropped, secret and extra-judicial 
killings” (Africa, 2013, p. 145). 
Humanitarianism: Perspectives from International and Local NGOs 
 The strength of local NGOs, such as LCDE, suggests a much more positive landscape 
than the available documentation of the post-earthquake recovery in Haiti. LCDE 
demonstrates a comprehensive understanding of how iNGOs and humanitarian aid have been 
used to consolidate imperialist presence in the Philippines, such as their complicity in the 
current counterinsurgency program. LCDE makes it clear to their donors and partner iNGOs 
that they cannot intervene with LCDE’s vision and mandate, nor conduct projects that are not 
in line with the priorities of POs. In fact in the past, LCDE has declined funding from 
OXFAM and USAID. OXFAM asked questions about the ‘rebels’ in the areas that LCDE 
serves, raising concerns about collusion with military forces to use recovery projects to 
advance counterinsurgency operations in the region. 
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However, there are organizations which LCDE has sustained partnerships with, 
including Hope Bridge Korea, German iNGO Diakonie Katastrophenhelfie, National 
Alliance for Filipino Concerns (NAFCON), and CARE Canada.  CARE Canada is one of the 
recipients of the Typhoon Haiyan Fund and also a member of the Devonshire Initiative (DI). 
While its membership to DI first alerted me to suspect that CARE projects easily advance 
Canadian corporate and military interests, its collaboration with LCDE demonstrates 
otherwise. 
 CARE Canada received $1M from the Typhoon Haiyan Relief Fund for an 
Emergency Shelter Program for an estimated 4,000 households, between 2013 and 2015. 
CARE “then decided to partner with LCDE for a Shelter Repair Kit Distribution program in 
Ormoc City and in the municipality of Albuera” (Artemio, personal interview, 2016). 
Another project with CARE involved a second local partner, Metro Ormoc Community 
Multi-Purpose Cooperative (OCCCI). OCCCI was a partner because they had access to a van 
able to securely transport cash assistance to beneficiaries (Lorena, personal interview, 2016). 
In sitio Cambabang in Barangay Cogon in Basey, the individual beneficiaries received 
P3,000 cash towards livelihood assistance. A previously established farmers PO, Cambabang 
Farmers Association, urged the beneficiaries to give P2000 to the farmers’ association fund. 
The organization then formed three groups among its members and divided the fund equally 
amongst the groups, who then determined “viable projects suited to their needs” (Solidargo, 
2014). Two groups bought land tractors for land preparation of rice fields, while the third 
group invested the fund in swine raising (Solidargo, 2014). Lorena recalled how CARE was 
impressed by the level of organization the residents of sitio Cambabang exemplified 
(personal communication, 2016). Similarly, the Mabini Farmers Association, based in 
Barangay Mabini, also pooled their funds to help another sitio start a cooperative store 
(Solidargo, 2014). 
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 Because LCDE maintains its connection with local POs as the vital force of their 
recovery work, it is able “to ensure that the joint CARE/LCDE project meets the genuine 
needs of the communities they serve” (Artemio, personal interview, 2016). LCDE applies a 
Community-Based Disaster Management (CBDM) approach to its recovery and rehabilitation 
initiatives, where beneficiaries of the projects are active actors in their recovery from 
disasters. The focus on development-oriented recovery is also intended as an effective way to 
reduce social vulnerability to disasters. LCDE in particular, facilitates and helps sustain POs 
efforts to return to Indigenous practices of production such as communal farming. The 
fostering of local development has profound consequences to the sociopolitical context of the 
communities. The strengthening of the local agricultural industry for instance, makes labour 
migration not the only option to survive. In addition, stronger self-reliant economies also 
empower citizens to not only rely on large-scale, foreign-owned mining companies to 
generate jobs. LCDE Executive Director Minet Jerusalem asserts that their organization 
establishes “unity with iNGOs under the general humanitarian principle” (personal interview, 
2016). This very unity with iNGOs that LCDE and its partner POs are able to establish, is 
what undermines the consolidation of Canadian imperialism in their region in the aftermath 
of typhoon Haiyan.  
Conclusion 
 Canada's economy is highly dependent on the labour and resources of less developed 
countries like the Philippines. This dependency is evident from the sheer number of Filipinos 
working in Canada as temporary foreign workers, live-in caregivers and as skilled workers. 
Meanwhile, Canada's economic dependence on the extractive industry is not only limited to 
conducting operations on originally Indigenous territories in Canada. The industry also 
extends to the Philippines, with Canada as the top foreign country to have the most number of 
mining tenements and largest mining tenement area in the archipelago. Many of these 
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companies employ paramilitary groups to enforce land displacement, most notably the case 
of TVI Pacific in Mount Balabag, Zamboanga del Sur. However, Canadian imperialist 
expansion is not met without resistance. Indigenous, peasant, and environmental 
organizations have resisted Canadian mining operations in the country. In Canada and in the 
Philippines, migrant justice organizations have critiqued not only the precarious conditions of 
migrant workers, but also the underdevelopment that pushes workers out of their home 
countries. 
In the aftermath of Typhoon Yolanda, Canada was quick in its response to send 
military personnel as the disaster response team, set up the Typhoon Haiyan Fund and make 
promises to expedite immigration applications from typhoon-struck areas. The recipients of 
the Typhoon Haiyan Fund are mostly organizations listed in the Devonshire Initiative, a 
consortium of mining companies and development iNGOs. This prompted me to assume that 
the recovery operations of iNGOs in Eastern Visayas were in fact, to undermine the social 
movements in the region. As discussed, Eastern Visayas is a site of on-going-armed conflict, 
where counterinsurgency operations materialize in the form of military violence and 'peace 
and development' programs conducted by NGOs. A few months after the typhoon, Canada 
and the Philippines signed a MoU legalizing regular joint military training, also signalling 
Canada's use of disaster relief operations to increase its presence in the Philippines. 
The local NGOs, such as LCDE, act as local partners of the iNGOs that received 
humanitarian aid to conduct disaster relief operations. While some iNGOs partnered with 
NGOs that aligned themselves with the neoliberal, or at best, counterinsurgency interests of 
the established state, a few, like CARE Canada, partnered with more community-based 
NGOs such as LCDE. LCDE, who takes their direction from people's organizations, have 
demonstrated an awareness of how the humanitarian aid industry is used to undermine 
communities' agency. LCDE carefully chooses whom to partner with and allows POs to also 
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exercise agency on how the recovery projects are implemented. By prioritizing local 
development that builds self-reliance of POs, LCDE's recovery projects ultimately 
undermines Canadian imperialism. In fact, POs have learned to utilize aid that could 
potentially result in less reliance on labour migration and foreign-owned mining operations. 
My fieldwork in Eastern Visayas has revealed that while Canada attempts to advance its 
political and economic interests through humanitarian aid intervention in the Philippines, 
NGOs and POs undermine, or at best, subvert Canadian imperialism. 
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Chapter 3 - Recovery through Recovery: The spirit of Bayanihan 
 
As the most eastern region of the archipelago, Eastern Visayas has welcomed countless 
tropical typhoons since time immemorial. Typhoon Yolanda was not the first, and certainly 
not the last, super typhoon to visit the region. It is a site where natural hazards have 
inevitably shaped its history and culture. Bankoff (2003) considers how Filipino values such 
as bayahinan have emerged as coping mechanisms that constitute what he calls cultures of 
disaster. He defines coping mechanisms as “strategies adopted by communities to reduce the 
impact of hazard or avoid the occurrence of disasters... and are based on the assumption that 
what has happened in the past is likely to repeat itself following a familiar pattern” (Bankoff, 
2003, p. 166). Although I concur that practices such as bayanihan indeed reduce impact of 
hazards, I do think that the term ‘coping mechanism’ is not enough to capture the depth of 
term. The word bayan, means nation, people or community. Bayanihan, or tiklos in Waray-
waray, is the manifestation of the will to survive collectively with the ever-changing 
environment. It celebrates life that is beyond anthropocentrism, as it honours the land and 
waters that nourish the community in all of its forms and processes. For instance, the practice 
of communal farming connotes how collective approaches to production have been engrained 
in our culture. The practice of collectively moving a house, also signals the impermanence of 
settlements, perhaps to adapt to changing environments and social conditions. Tiklos, is also a 
community dance, performed before and in between collectively working in the fields.  
The spirit of bayanihan, guides this chapter, and is a key finding in this inquiry. 
Several times throughout my research, bayanihan came up through interviews both as the 
counterinsurgency program, and as a local concept to refer to cooperation people exude 
during recovery efforts. Limited resources and relentless military violence have made disaster 
risk reduction work challenging for local NGOs and POs, but they continue to serve their 
communities in innovative and creative ways. The true spirit of tiklos or bayanihan manifests 
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in their application of Community-Based Disaster Response/Management in conducting 
disaster recovery and rehabilitation work.  
This chapter discusses the efforts conducted with POs and NGOs in Eastern Visayas 
towards not only recovering from Yolanda, but ultimately from the  root causes that 
generated their vulnerability to disasters  — chronic poverty and landlessness. Based on their 
accounts,  I do not limit ‘recovery’ in terms of recovery from disasters, but the communities I 
spent time with also referred to ‘recovery’ as recovery from the impacts of 
counterinsurgency. The chapter begins with a brief history of the Leyte Development Centre, 
the local NGO that conducts disaster recovery and rehabilitation work in Eastern Visayas. 
The rest is divided into seven more sections, under the different, but interrelated, work that 
POs and NGOs engage in. All of these types of work are part of disaster recovery work, as 
POs and NGOs have a general understanding that: first, disaster survivors must actively be 
involved in recovery; second, recovery work is inseparable from addressing the root causes 
that makes their communities vulnerable to disasters to begin with; and third, that disaster 
recovery is a long-term process and requires a strong network of support. These principles 
guide their approaches to their work.  
 
Responding to the needs of the region 
 
“Mmm may formula kami diyan! Risk with high vulnerability plus low 
capacity equals disaster. Kung mataas ang vulnerability, tapos low ang 
capacity to rise, disaster yon. Pero if [yung bagyo] will strike on a 
community na mataas ang capacity, walang disaster.” [We have a formula 
for that! Risk with high vulnerability plus low capacity equals disaster. If the 
vulnerability is high, and [the community] has a low capacity to rise, that’s a 
disaster. But if [a typhoon] will strike a community that has high capacity, 
then there would be no disaster] (Perla, personal communication 2016). 
 
The Leyte Centre for Development (LCDE) uses the Community-Based Disaster 
Management (CBDM) approach, which is centred in the belief that “communities themselves 
can reduce the effects of disaster” (Jerusalem, personal communication, 2016).  LCDE is a 
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regional partner of the national organization Citizens’ Disaster Response Centre (CDRC). 
Rosalinda Tablang, the Executive Director of CDRC refers to CBDM as an organization that 
“raises the capacity of the people and the communities so they themselves to respond 
whenever they are faced with the danger of disaster. The organization defines vulnerability of 
communities during disasters are “brought about by their political and economic conditions” 
(Citizens’ Disaster Response Centre, 2008). According to Tablang, having this definition of 
vulnerability is what makes the work of CDRC, and I add their regional partners as well, in 
disaster management “different and important” (Citizens’ Disaster Response Centre, 2008). 
Similarly, Community Based Disaster Preparedness, is defined as a series of approaches that 
“emphasise community self-reliance, raising awareness of vulnerability and the root causes 
of disasters and developing practical problem solving skills” (Allen, 2006). 
Leyte Centre for Development (LCDE) started in 1987 by church workers who are 
committed to social action. It was initially established in 1986 as the ILAW Resource Centre 
(IRC), aimed at “conscientizing people for self-reliance and empowerment through research 
and socio-economic services” (Citizens’ Disaster Response Centre, 2014). Jerusalem 
expressed that it focused on examining the situation of marginalized communities in the 
province of Leyte (personal interview, 2016). In May 1988, it was registered with the 
Security and Exchange Commission under the name Leyte Centre for Development and 
Education, and became an affiliate of Citizens’ Disaster Response Network (CDRN), a 
national formation of disaster response non-governmental development organizations. In 
response to the needs of the community, LCDE shifted its focus from “development 
education” to “sustainable economic community programs and disaster 
response/management” (Citizens’ Disaster Response Centre, 2014). Such a shift was the 
realization of their extensive research and integration with local communities (Jerusalem, 
personal interview, 2016). The organization dropped ‘education’ from their name, but 
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maintained the acronym LCDE. In 1997, LCDE extended their area of service to the entire 
region to Samar, after it was selected to be the “caretaker” of the Centre for the Relief and 
Rehabilitation of Samar, also a member of CDRC” (Citizens’ Disaster Response Centre, 
2014). In its operations, LCDE services the entire Eastern Visayas region.  
 
Recovery from Counterinsurgency 
 
 The “Palparan era” and subsequent counterinsurgency operations in the region have 
greatly impacted communities in the region as many informants suggest. As one of the 
poorest areas in the archipelago, the conditions of farmers in the interiors make them 
vulnerable, and are worsened by the frequency of natural hazards in the area. In this section, I 
discuss the efforts of community members, with the help of human rights organizations and 
LCDE, to recover from the impacts of military violence in their areas. 
The intense periods of violence against organizers and development workers 
discouraged many community leaders to sustain their POs. Nanay Lydia, an organizer in the 
region noted how there were at times, only a few peasants were left with the determination to 
keep organizing, “iilan lang kami nagkilos, konti lang kami nagkilos [few of us were left to 
act]” (Lydia, personal interview, 2016). She further describes areas that have restarted 
farmers associations as ‘recovered.’ She regards the help of Katungod (meaning “rights” in 
Waray) a human rights organization, as instrumental in recovering the area. Katungod hosted 
educational sessions to residents that included how to properly document human rights 
violations and basic paralegal training. “Para hindi matakot” says Nanay Lydia, “kung may 
nagtanong sa inyo sa sundalo, tanungin ninyo rin sila, anong unit kayo? Anong layunin 
ninyo? Pag tinanong kayo, tanungin mo rin sila. [If you are asked by soldiers, ask them what 
unit are you part of? What do you want from us? If they ask you questions, ask them too]” 
(Lydia, personal interview, 2016). The farmers were also informed that they in fact, are not 
obliged to answer any questions, that they are allowed to take photos of any military 
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personnel, that no authority is allowed to enter their homes without a search warrant, and that 
search warrants are only valid for 12 days.  
Katungod encouraged to report any incidences to other surrounding communities, 
specifically over the local radio station. Katungod upholds the Comprehensive Agreement in 
Human Rights. “Ngayon palaban na sila [now they have a fighting spirit and attitude],” 
asserts Nanay Lydia. She expresses pride over the organizing work she has done in a 
recovered area, and reminded me of the sacrifices she has made to be able to do this work, 
including leaving her child in her hometown. Since military threat and harassment is included 
as a community risk, Makaryo and Perla explain that the International Committee of Red 
Cross (ICRC) and human rights organization Katungod aid in the monitoring and 
documenting of human rights violations perpetrated by military personnel. 
After helping Albuera re-start their farmers organizations, Marya has moved to the 
city to support the organizing efforts of urban dwellers. Before she arrived in Ormoc, she has 
assumed that the residents have stopped organizing since the Palparan era of continual EJKs 
and forced disappearances. But to her surprise, many residents revealed that “they have been 
secretly organizing POs for years - meeting and recruiting clandestinely” (Marya, personal 
interview, 2016). In her view, “recovery does not happen from the intentional efforts of 
outside forces, but the people themselves have the will and capacity to organize themselves” 
(Marya, personal interview, 2016). 
In December 2015, she helped organize market and street vendors, many of them are 
from fisherfolks communities. Many of the women sell vegetables in the market while their 
partners are out fishing. Community organizing efforts have been continually met with 
challenges. For instance, jeepney drivers in Ormoc City who are members of PISTON, a 
partylist, have been kicked out of the jeepney terminal. They could no longer put PISTON 
stickers on the jeepneys anymore, or identify openly as members. But Marya said how the 
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jeepney drivers were still amongst the 4000 people who participated in a protest to demand 
the government for shelter assistance.  
After Yolanda, two other major typhoons also brought damage to Eastern Visayas. 
People's Surge organically transformed as an alliance of survivors of not only Yolanda, but of 
all disasters, "natural or man-made" (Tala, personal interview, 2016). Militarization is 
considered a man-made disaster. Tala illustrates how militarization is more apparent in the 
areas where communities organize and where there are mining operations. While there is a 
specific organization for victims of militarization in Eastern Visayas, they are also part of the 
alliance of People's Surge. For People's Surge "kung may militarisasyon, mga tao ay hindi 
nakakapag-hanap buhay [When there is militarization, the people cannot work] (Tala, 
personal interview, 2016). Peasants report how the military step on their crops and harass 
them for information on the NPA. "Natatakot na, hindi na sila pupunta sa sakahan. Naiiwan 
ng ilang araw.  Calamity talaga sia. Paano makakakain, paano ang pagkain nila kung sirain 
at susunugin ang mga bahay at anihan? [They get scared, they do not go to their fields. The 
crops are left unattended for days. It is definitely a calamity. How will they eat, how will 
there be food if their homes and crops are destroyed?]" (Tala, personal interview, 2016). 
People's Surge was formed in January 25, 2014, when 12,000 people marched in 
Tacloban City to demand the government to grant the Yolanda survivors P40,000 financial 
assistance each (Tala, personal interview, 2016; Gabieta, 2014), and the scrapping of the 40-
metre No Build Zone policy, later changed to No Dwelling Zone (see Appendix C). People's 
Surge is a coalition of organizations, alliances and individuals in Eastern Visayas who 
identify as disaster survivors, first inspired by ABBAYT - Aliyansa ng mga Biktima ng 
Bayong Yolanda sa Tacloban (Tala, personal interview, 2016). Before Yolanda, Tala was the 
barangay secretary in an interior town. "Nasa bahay lang ako dati [I was just at home 
before]" (Tala, personal interview, 2016). Her town was out of the 50KM radius covered by 
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Rehabilitation Assistance Yolanda, so the residents took it upon themselves to organize a 
campaign to demand that relief be extended to them. "Totally damanged ang aming pananim. 
[Our crops were totally damaged]"  (Tala, personal interview, 2016). And so they started 
expressing their pleas over local radio. The SAGUPA chapter, a farmers’ organization in 
their area joined People's Surge, and organized individuals to also join the alliance as well. 
Since then, she has been organizing full-time with People's Surge, leaving her 2 children 
behind with her mother. "Para sa mga mamamayan [For the people]" she explains (Tala, 
personal interview, 2016). 
 
Building people’s participation in disaster management 
 
 Centering community participation in disaster management, the POs operate as the 
most basic level of community governance. The Disaster Training conducted by LCDE 
facilitates the generation of a disaster plan from the knowledge of the residents about the 
conditions, capacities and hazards that they are vulnerable to. Through that participatory 
process, the expertise and knowledge is passed on to POs. Established institutions such as 
LCDE are able to invest in the training and updating of the skills of their staff, most of whom 
come from peasant families. Through the formation of a Disaster Preparedness Committee, 
the training builds the organization capacity of the POs to gain agency over disaster 
management in their communities.  
 In fact, residents who were first hesitant to join POs eventually express interest when 
they see how successful the disaster recovery projects are in their area (Solidargo, 2014; 
Artemio, personal interview, 2016). Lorena recalls how when the carabaos [water buffalos] 
started coming, the residents who were first hesitant to join the POs said, “Isali ninyo na ko 
diyan! [Make a member now!]” (Lorena, personal interview, 2016) “After Yolanda, marami 
ng gusto magpamiyembro ng mga PO, gaya ng Maguuma nga Nakaiusa sa Albuera [After 
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Yolanda, many wanted to be member of POs, like the farmers association in Albuera]” 
(Marya, personal interview, 2016).  
LCDE schedules the 3-day long Disaster Preparedness trainings in-between harvest 
seasons so the farmers can participate. The PO officers and members are participants of the 
training themselves. These people form a Disaster Preparedness Committee and take 
responsibility for disaster management in the community. The training of CBDM is an 
orientation of the “Philippine situation,” specifically what geographical, political and 
economic factors make the Philippines prone to disasters. This includes updated information 
about worsening hazards due to climate change. The second part of the training is a collective 
identification of hazards and risks in the area, as well as the resources in the community. 
Then the trainers facilitate the creation of a counter-disaster plan for before, during and after 
disaster. “[The participants] will identify the risks in their community, and they know the 
resources, and then they decide what to do” (Makaryo, personal interview, 2016). At the end, 
the participants consolidate their three distinct maps: the hazard map, the resource map and 
the area map. They also culminate the training with a ‘disaster community drill’. The draft of 
the counter-disaster plan is posted in a public place such as the barangay hall to allow the 
“community to assess the draft” (Makaryo, personal interview, 2016). While not everyone in 
the community is a PO member, everyone in the area is taken into account in the plan.  
There are basic requirements that facilitators suggest to be included in the plan. For 
example, Perla explains that houses in the seashore are prioritized for evacuation at the event 
of a typhoon and/or a storm surge. Second, Persons with Disabilities (PWD), pregnant 
women, elderly and lactating mothers are identified “vulnerable” and therefore to be the first 
to be evacuated. Part of the counter-disaster plan is for the POs to conduct monthly 
assessments. Simultaneously, the LCDE also conducts weekly or monthly monitoring of the 
community that they currently have a project with. The assessments take in the form of a 
 62 
public meeting with the community. Increase in capacity and self-reliance is evident in the 
communities where LCDE has conducted trainings, according to informants. Makaryo 
narrates how many of the evacuation sites assigned by the government are assessed by 
communities as not safe, such as government buildings, schools, churches, and barangay hall 
(personal interview, 2016). In Barangay MacArthur, Eastern Samar, the community decided 
to choose a resident’s big concrete house as the evacuation site. “That’s the beauty, they 
know what to do. Even without LCDE, they knew what to do during evacuation” (Perla, 
personal interview, 2016). One sitio in EV developed a disaster preparedness plan with the 
support of LCDE. The residents did not follow the government’s order to evacuate to the 
nearest school building. Their assessment was correct. The roof of the school was blown off 
by Yolanda (Jerusalem, personal interview, 2016). In another sitio in Marabo, the community 
chose a kweba [cave] as their evacuation site as part of their plan. They pre-evaluated the site 
assigned of the government, which was a school with poor structure. The school sustained 
significant damage by the strong typhoon winds during typhoon Ruby.  
The Disaster Management Training Team gave training to a PO in a barangay in 
Basey, Samar. “There is a human disaster in their community,” describes Makaryo (personal 
interview, 2016). AFP is illegally camping inside the village, which is prohibited under the 
Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights & International Humanitarian Law 
(CARHRIHL).  In 2015, the New People’s Army ambushed the military camp at 5AM: 
 
“The members of the community, especially the children, they are still sleeping. 
And some of their families are in the farm. Some of the people in the community 
were still in the house to attend their children… They were organized. They have a 
warning committee. And she’s a woman. And that woman, she was running 
around the community informing them that they have to make it to the plaza. They 
have to evacuate to the other barangay. If they individually evacuate, they might 
be targeted by military. Instead of going to the to the evacuation area one by one, 
they did it in groups. It is very dangerous to evacuate alone, because the military 
might think, ‘oh you’re an NPA...’ The evacuation site… the other barangay was 
just walking distance.” (Makaryo, personal interview, 2016) 
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People are empowered as active actors towards recovery 
 In areas that have re-initiated POs, the farmers return to collective projects to improve 
local economies and build sustainable livelihoods. The peasants in Carigara reformed their 
farmers’ association. Nanay Lydia reported that they have reintroduced the traditional 
practice called tiklos, where farmers“ay tumutulong sa pag-aararo at pagtatanim [help in 
ploughing and planting] each other’s farms. LCDE accepts funding for projects, or designs 
the projects themselves, that centre the people’s participation in recovery. Paired with the 
capacity-building trainings to POs, community-based efforts also allow POs to not be passive 
recipients of NGO and iNGO-funded projects implemented in their areas.   
CARE funded, in partnership with LCDE, a shelter repair kit assistance program in 
January 2014. Artemio was hired to implement that project. Phase 1: Distributed shelter 
repair kits that gave them tools to repair their house and cash assistance worth P3000 to 
purchase wood for four months.  There were two roving teams, composed of a mobilizer and 
two carpenters, to visit all Phase 1 beneficiaries’ houses. The teams checked if the structures 
complied with the “Build Back Safer” standards. “Sila na magpapantay ng bahay mismo, 
[They will fix the alignment of the house themselves]” shared Artemio. Phase 2 started in 
June 2014, where they distributed P5000 cash assistance to build roof that was only available 
to half the number of beneficiaries from Phase 1. Artemio noted that they heard from other 
community residents that other people sold their shelter repair kits. LCDE conducted a 
house-to-house survey to evaluate if the shelter assistance kit was utilized properly.  
 Artemio, a graduate of BS Animal Science, now works on another project with 
EVRAP. He was not involved in development work before he joined the CARE project nor 
had an educational background directly related to disaster management. But Lorena 
explained how their workers come from various educational and professional backgrounds, 
 64 
and someone like Artemio with an Animal Science degree is able to build communities’ 
capacity towards livestock rearing (personal interview, 2016).  
Another project with CARE, this time involved a second local partner, Metro Ormoc 
Community Multi-Purpose Cooperative (OCCCI). OCCCI was a partner because they had 
the security van to be able to securely transport cash assistance to beneficiaries. In sitio 
Cambabang in Barangay Cogon in Basey, the individual beneficiaries received P3,000 cash 
towards livelihood assistance. A previously established farmers PO, Cambabang Farmers 
Association, urged the beneficiaries to give P2000 to the organization’s fund. The 
organization then formed three groups among its members and divided the fund equally 
amongst the groups, who then decided amongst themselves “viable projects suited to their 
needs” (Solidargo, 2014). Two groups bought land tractors for land preparation of rice fields, 
while the third group invested the fund in swine raising (Solidargo, 2014). Lorena recalled 
how CARE was impressed by the level of organization the residents of sitio Cambabang 
exemplified (personal communication, 2016). Similarly, the Mabini Farmers Association, 
based in Barangay Mabini, also pooled their funds to help another sitio start a cooperative 
store (Solidargo, 2014). 
 EVRAP also conducted a swine dispersal project where they distributed 10 piglets to 
Vigan Farmers Association, a local peasant organization. Five recipients, picked from a 
bunutan [draw], received two piglets that they were required to rear and pass on two 
offspring to another association member. The NGOs also assisted in the formation of 
cooperative stores in various sitios, where goods are sold at a price cheaper than privately-
owned stores. While membership is required to benefit the profits from the coop store, 
anyone can buy from the store (Lorena, personal interview, 2016). The existence of 
cooperative stores ensures that the prices of the merchandise are affordable post-typhoon, 
when commercial stores increase their prices to exploit low supply and high demand 
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(Solidargo, 2014). In a sitio in Eastern Samar, a transportation cooperative as granted one 
motorboat. The association itself owns the motorboat collectively (Artemio, personal 
communication, 2016).  
 Continued support is also extended even after the projects are completed. “Yung mga 
pinagkakaitaan dati na PO, binabalikan lang namin. [The POs that we worked with before, 
we return to them]” (Artemio, personal interview, 2016). After Disaster Preparedness 
Workshops, the facilitators also maintain communication with the POs (Makaryo, personal 
interview, 2016). 
 
Community as active actors in social transformation 
 
 The expansive network of existing multi sectoral organizations made the formation of 
People's Surge, an alliance of Yolanda disaster survivors, possible. "Mga peasant, kabataan, 
fisherfolk, taong simbahan, lahat ng mga organisasyon na into sama-sama, kahit mga NGOs 
[The peasants, youth, fisherfolk, church clergy, all organizations joined forces, even NGOs]” 
(Tala, personal interview, 2016). In February to March 2015, Tala was one of the delegates 
that went "para kalampagin [to shake up]" Manila (Tala, personal interview, 2016). They had 
three demands: first, for the government to grant P40K immediate cash relief; second, to 
scrap the NBZ policy; and third, to demand that relief efforts must be sustained and reverse 
the declaration of "State of Rehabilitation" in Eastern Visayas. Disaster survivors presented 
these demands to Malacanang and various government agencies (see Appendix F). The 
contingent was repeatedly refused by DSWD Secretary Dinky Soliman:  
“Gusto daw niya i-meet yung mga biktima. Ayaw pa niya kami paniwalaan, 
tinulak nanaman sia ng mga taga dito [sa Tacloban]. Gumastos kami para 
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makapunta duon. E andun kami, para kami ang makipag-usap. Sinalubong sila ng 
protesta dito! So pagbalik nila sa Manila, napilitan na sila kausapin kami. 
 
[She said she wanted to meet with the victims. She would not believe us, but the 
people here [in Tacloban] pushed them. We spent money to be there [in Manila]. 
We are there to have a dialogue. They were met with a protest here.  So when they 
went back to Manila, they were forced to talk to us.]” (Tala, personal interview, 
2016). 
 
The legitimacy of People’s Surge as representatives of Yolanda survivors was questioned by 
Soliman, which I argue is derived from the same logic where the practice of red-tagging also 
stems from. The condemnation of POs  and NGOs as associated with the NPA not only 
makes civilians targets of military violence, but ultimately undermines their work. The logic 
of ‘red-tagging’ sets up a convenient narrative for the AFP that organizers and development 
workers have hidden agendas behind the work that they are engaged in. Specifically, Soliman 
questioning Tala’s legitimacy as a Yolanda survivor as aims to discredit her identity as a 
disaster survivor, and disregards the fact that disaster survivors themselves have the will and 
capacity to organize themselves. 
Two other PO organizers, Marya and Nanay Lydia themselves come from the ranks 
of the peasant class and gained experience out of their own organizing efforts. Despite the 
long history of extrajudicial killings and harassment in Eastern Visayas, they both continue to 
volunteer to share those skills and knowledge with neighbouring communities. Organizers 
dedicate their lives to doing this work without compensation while facing many risks.  
LCDE Executive Director Minnette Jerusalem was in Manila at the time of Yolanda, 
where she and her colleagues at Citizen Disaster Response Centre worked double time to 
submit funding proposals iNGOs as quickly as possible. Jerusalem, the Executive Director of 
LCDE since 2000, has been working in and with different POs and NGOs for the past 36 
years (personal interview, 2016). Jerusalem arrived in Leyte a few days after Yolanda, and 
with her were representatives and volunteers from various iNGOs. She recalls how LCDE’s 
“knowledge of people and mastery of the community were key factors” in strengthening 
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partnerships with iNGOs in immediate post-Yolanda emergency response (Jerusalem, 
personal interview, 2016).  
LCDE was nationally recognized in 2007 as the “Most outstanding NGO in Aid and 
Disaster Response,” winning against World Vision. LCDE is also a member of National 
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) committees, Department of Services and 
Welfare Development (DSWD) and the National Anti-Poverty Commission. While LCDE 
continues to criticize the government for its inadequacy in addressing the conditions that 
increase the regions’ vulnerability to disasters, Jerusalem asserts that they maintain a good 
relationship with both the local and national government (personal interview, 2016). In many 
ways LCDE has even filled the role of LGUs. LCDE has noted that on a few occasions, the 
LGUs takes credit for what NGOs like LCDE have accomplished (Makaryo and Rosaryo, 
personal interviews, 2016). As I’ve discussed in the previous chapter, LCDE’s relationship 
with the POs is the vital force of their disaster recovery work.  
Following LCDE and also CDRC’s approach in deepening cooperation between local 
NGO’s, iNGOs and governments reveals the role NGOs can play in improving governance in 
relation to recovery work. First, LCDE collaborates with POs that respect and recognize their 
organization and autonomy. Second, LCDE acts as the institutional bridge between iNGOs 
and local communities. It acts as a platform for iNGOs to take direction from local POs. 
Third, LCDE acts as an institutional bridge between local governments and its citizens. It acts 
as a platform for citizens to influence policies and resource allocation, as well as a platform 
for LGUs to remain accountable to its citizens.  
 
Empowering POs as legitimate organs of governance 
 
 The Leyte Centre for Development owes its stability over the years from its ability to 
adapt and respond to the ever changing needs of the communities it serves. As an institution 
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that has the organizational capacity to relate to, and coordinate with various funding bodies, 
LCDE facilitates the full participation of POs, mostly made of farmers associations, in 
disaster management projects. 
The collaboration with POs can begin even during the proposal stages. LCDE, in 
direct consultation with the POs, prepare the proposals, design the project and propose a 
budget plan. “LCDE will help, but the idea will come from the POs.. The design, their needs. 
They would say, ‘for our organization, we need rice mills’” (Lorena, personal interview, 
2016). In some cases, the PO itself will write the proposal and submit it directly to the 
funders. LCDE would function as a resource and support to help the PO implement their 
project successfully. “Yung purpose namin dito para sila mismo yung magmaneho. [Our 
purpose here is for the POs to take the driver’s seat]” (Artemio, personal communication, 
2016). Lorena and Artemio outline the work that is done during the proposal stage: 
 
Lorena: “First we do base-line data gathering. Yung community, we ask them what they need. And 
then from those data, that's the time we make the proposal. We also do canvassing for the motorboat, 
how much is the machine, how much is paggawa ng bangka. And even diba? The project that we're 
doing right now, we also do base-line data gathering. In the project area, we ask the people, even if its 
a farming community, the needs of the farmers vary place to place. They see we need like this like 
that. That's what we really reflect on the proposal” 
 
Artemio: “Kunwari yung ano kailangan ng POs, kung ano kailangan nila, sinasubmit namin sa 
opisina. Tapos pinag-uusapan namin kung anong mas magandang strategy o quality na binibigay 
namin sa PO. Tapos balik kami sa community tapos yun, ang PO naman mismo ang kwan, mag-
approve na eto yung ibibigay namin sa inyo. So anong may mga troubleshoot sa farming tools, kami 
yung mismong tutulong sa kanila. Kung may mga livestock na ibibigay, kami rin ung mag-aaassist. 
Parang give and take ba. 
 
[For example, what the POs need, we [in Eastern Visayas Rural Assistance Program] submit [the list] 
to the office. And then we discuss which strategies and what quality of work we can provide the POs. 
We report the project we come up with back to the PO, and the POs will approve themselves what we 
present to them. So if there is anything to troubleshoot with farming tools, we will be the ones who 
will support them. If there is livestock donated to them, we will also assist them. It’s like give and 
take]” (Artemio, personal communication, 2016). 
 
 LCDE and EVRAP do not only provide institutional support to POs, but also 
encourage and strengthen POs themselves. “Ang purpose ng EVRAP to pagkakaiisa ng mga 
tao, hindi mag-kanya kanya [The purpose of EVRAP is to unite people, and [for them] not to 
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live their lives individually],” explained by Artemio (personal interview, 2016). The NGOs 
seek the permission of the barangay captain to call for an assembly in a public area such as 
the barangay hall. There, they introduce EVRAP and LCDE, and explain that they could 
potentially support a project in the barangay. During the assembly, they try to document the 
needs are in the community and gauge their interest. In many cases, pre-existing POs are 
present in these assemblies. If there are no POs in the barangay, EVRAP encourages them to 
form one, such as farmers associations.  
 
Providing institutional support to facilitate between POs and iNGOs 
 
 International NGOs were one of the largest contributors of emergency funding used in 
relief and rehabilitation post-Yolanda. However, the trend towards greater reliance of CSOs 
and NGOs to administer public services resulted in the increase of administrative 
bureaucracy that NGOs have to keep up with. Jerusalem recalls the relative ease for NGOs to 
operate in the 1980s, when reporting was much more lenient (personal interview, 2016). 
Nowadays, donors require not only detailed proposals, but also paperwork for reporting 
purposes. Donor agencies require extensive documentation of activities and detailed 
accounting of expenses incurred during the implementation of a project. To prepare such 
reports can only be accomplished by having dedicated and skilled staff. The expertise to keep 
up with the demands of the administrative labour required from NGOs one of the reasons that 
make NGOs such as LCDE valuable to POs, even if the POs themselves can apply for the 
funding directly. 
LCDE’s goal is to “maximize iNGO money to the poorest communities without 
compromising our principles” (Jerusalem, personal interview, 2016). However, the 
organization makes it clear that their donors and partner iNGOs cannot intervene with their 
vision mission and mandate.  LCDE remains vigilant to the contradictory roles that iNGOs 
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and NGOs play in the civil society. Varying roles of NGOs are demonstrated in the history of 
different political and ideological lines that CSOs in the Philippine emerged from, as 
discussed in earlier chapters. Cognizant of the contradictions in the humanitarian aid industry 
and iNGOs, Jerusalem asserts that LCDE has “unity with iNGO’s under the general 
humanitarian principle” (personal interview, 2016). One example is LCDE’s collaboration 
with CARE International. CARE’s work with LCDE as a local partner begins with the 
conceptualization of the project itself — they discuss together, share feedback and agree on 
the project together. As local partners, LCDE and EVRAP are the ones that troubleshoot any 
problems that may arise during project implementation, as opposed to the funding iNGO.  
 Despite LCDE’s commitment to utilize all available resources for community-based 
work, they still maintain strict criteria as to which projects to take on and which organizations 
to collaborate with. LCDE has declined funding offers from OXFAM and USAID. They 
recalled how OXFAM USA “kept asking” LCDE staff about “rebels,” which made them 
uneasy given the longstanding impacts of the counterinsurgency program in the region. 
Meanwhile, USAID offered funding to conduct a reproductive health program, which 
entailed selling contraceptives to target communities. LCDE declined the offer as the 
program does not correspond with their priorities. Making contraceptives available for 
purchase, for instance, was not identified as an immediate nor long-term need of the 
communities with regards to reducing disaster risk. 
Strengthening partnerships between government and CSOs 
 Community-based disaster management advocates holistic approaches to disaster risk 
reduction and recognize the importance of cooperation between CSOs and government units. 
Such partnerships are based on the assumption that while CSOs may have the will to innovate 
disaster management strategies, they more often than not, lack the capacity and resources. On 
 71 
the other hand, government agencies have capacity and resources, and can be prompted to 
innovate through enough community pressure (Allen, 2006, p. 94). While collaborations can 
mimic neoliberal strategies of “multi-stakeholder alliances or civil society–government 
partnership arrangements,” Allen (2006) further discusses how such partnerships may serve 
as a deflection from the government to take responsibility over recovery work, and in turn, 
also increase regulation of CSOs (p. 94). But on the other hand, such collaborative 
partnerships may actually provide the platform to maximize resources to achieve the 
‘reversal’ of vulnerabilities. “CBDP institutions are particularly vulnerable to cooption by 
external actors where initiatives have focused on working with single, isolated communities. 
Therefore, formal incorporation into a wider network of CBDP institutions may help to 
dissipate clientelistic ties and promote more effective civil society mobilisation.” (Allen, 
2006, p. 95). One example of these formalized network of institutions using the community-
based approach is the Asian-Pacific Alliance for Disaster Management (A-PAD). 
(A-PAD) Philippines, a national formation that outlines how “resources can be 
shared” amongst NGOs, private companies and the government in emergency disaster 
response, was established in March 3, 2016 (Citizens’ Disaster Response Centre, 2016). 
CDRC’s membership to A-PAD demonstrates how institutions can utilize partnerships to 
actually create innovation in disaster management practices. A-PAD also presents a  more 
nuanced understanding on how NGOs like CDRC and LCDE can position themselves in age 
of increasing reliance on private-public partnerships (PPP) in providing basic services to 
society. In fact, CDRC was one of the two founding organizations of A-PAD, along with 
Philippine Disaster Resilience Foundation (PDRF), the country’s “major private sector 
vehicle for disaster management” (Citizens’ Disaster Response Centre, 2016). CDRC (2016) 
called A-PAD a “tripartite collaboration on disaster management”, maximizing their role in 
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disaster management in the Philippines. CDRC’s membership in A-PAD ensures that it can 
play as a key facilitator in disaster management efforts. 
Since the recent inception of A-PAD Philippines, an MoU has been signed amongst 
LGU officials, CDRC, academic institutions, media groups and businesses that “formalized 
an agreement to work together for disaster risk reduction and emergency response” in the 
Bicol region, north of Eastern Visayas (Stakeholders sign MOU on disaster management, 
n.d.). The MoU reveals the nature of CDRC as a bridge in linking up stakeholder in DRR 
work, as well as illustrates its potential in improving DRR in Eastern Visayas if a similar 
MoU is signed in the region.  
 
“Each party also defined its specific role in the platform. The Metro Naga 
Development Council (MNDC), for instance, will mainstream policies, plans, and 
advocates to the LGUs, while the City Disaster Risk Reduction Management 
Office (CDRRMO) will harmonize policies, plans, and programs and come up 
with a synchronized mechanism within Metro Naga. Furthermore, the Metro Naga 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry will work on the business continuity plan of 
small and medium enterprises and ensure price stabilization during disaster. The 
media group, on the other hand, vowed to provide timely information and disaster 
warning before and during an emergency. The academe and the CSOs, for their 
part, agreed to focus on trainings, awareness raising, and research.” (Stakeholders 
sign MOU on disaster management, n.d.). 
 
CDRC’s mandate and unique approach is manifested in the MoU. First, it was able to clearly 
define the specific roles of each stakeholder. The clarity and consolidation of tasks in one is 
discussed in Chapter 2. In fact, it highlights the stability of local economies as crucial in 
effective Disaster Recovery. Third, the eagerness of the LGU in forging a formal relationship 
with CDRC emphasizes the fact that it is in the best interest of the government to utilize the 
expertise of CDRC. The article in the CDRC website refers the partnership “drawn from the 
bayanihan spirit” (CDRC, 2016). CDRC shows effectiveness in acting as a bridge not just 
between LGUs and POs, but also between LGU and the private sector.  
Government units and iNGOs tend to be reactive to disasters, notes Jerusalem 
(personal interview, 2016). But LCDE is hopeful that A-PAD can encourage the government 
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and the private sector to adapt CBDM approach and methods in disaster management, 
specifically addressing the root causes of vulnerabilities (Jerusalem, personal interview, 
2016). In defining LCDE’s relationship with the private sector, Jerusalem asserts, “we 
criticize them, but we seek unity with them in common issues” (Jerusalem, personal 
interview, 2016). A-PAD then sets a framework for NGOs like CDRC and LCDE to define 
their “unity” with private sector and LGUs in DRR work. In particular, A-PAD has given 
LCDE an opportunity to work with the small and medium business in EV to pre-position 
imperishable goods to be ready to be released in case of a major natural hazard. Jerusalem 
gave the example of a large-scale rice producer who has pledged rice donations, and another 
business committed delivery trucks to be used for relief delivery to communities even before 
typhoon hits.  
 The Disaster Preparedness Training Team of LCDE not only conducts trainings to 
POs, but also to LGUs. LCDE helped an LGU in the province of Samar form a Disaster Risk 
Reduction Committee. Makaryo narrated how some municipalities have a Barangay Action 
Risk Committee in place, but were not functional because of lack of knowledge and training.  
 
Makaryo: We invite them to join or participate in our training. 
Kim: How does that go?  
Perla: They just thank us! They are very grateful that we do the first move. 
Makaryo: Especially in the upland communities 
Rosaryo: The members of the POs are [in many occassions] members of the barangay 
council. So they are part of the LGU… We also encourage the PO to coordinate with the 
LGU. It is their primary resource. We [LCDE] are only there for mostly support. 
 
The barangay chairman is invited to the committee meetings, and the committee members 
actually play a role in governance. LCDE regards CBDM as also involving higher 
government units like the municipal government and other government agencies. “We 
coordinate with them in all our activities,” Rosaryo explains (Rosaryo, personal interview, 
2016.  
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 Overall, given the continuing conflict between CPP-NPA-NDF and the GRP, the 
tendency for government units is to not recognize the legitimacy of POs as organs of local 
governance. The ‘red-tagging’ of PO organizers that turn them into targets of EJKs and 
military harassment, speak to how the counterinsurgency program created a climate of 
mistrust amongst stakeholders that should otherwise work together towards effective disaster 
risk reduction. However, the reality of how POs operate amidst the armed conflict 
demonstrates a degree of nuance in the ways local governance is organized in various areas. 
In some instances, the difference between barangay leadership and POs are blurry. As 
Rosaryo points out, some of the PO members sit on the barangay council. The Disaster Plan 
created by the PO and executed by the Disaster Preparedness Committee, applies to all 
residents of the barangay, whether or not they are members of the PO. Furthermore, as 
discussed in earlier chapters, the POs have allowed disaster survivors to be active recipients 
of recovery projects, allowing them to make collective decisions over how to manage 
resources, and have the opportunity to apply for funding directly from iNGOs.  
 The close partnership between POs and NGOs, like LCDE and EVRAP, fosters the 
building of organization capacity of the populations that are most vulnerable to disasters. As 
Artemio, an EVRAP staff emphasized, “ang purpose ng EVRAP to pagkakaiisa ng mga tao, 
hindi mag-kanya kanya [The purpose of EVRAP is to unite people, and [for them] not to live 
their lives individually]” (Artemio, personal interview, 2016). In the spirit of bayanihan, the 
full participation of people is central to disaster risk reduction, as dominant approaches have 
proved to be ineffective, or worse, further enhancing people’s vulnerabilities to disaster. 
POs and NGOs in Eastern Visayas continue to conduct recovery work despite the risk 
the hazards of militarization and super typhoons. But even more notable is the fact that they 
conduct work to recover not only what was lost before Yolanda, but ultimately take back 
what was rightfully theirs. Centuries of colonization, feudal relations, militarization, and poor 
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governance have prohibited communities to engage in sustainable sources of livelihood. 
NGOs in this context functions as institutions that facilitate the creation of a web of network 
that enable a multi-sectoral approach to disaster recovery and rehabilitation. Drawing from 
the experiences of POs and NGOs in Eastern Visayas, it is apparent that disaster risk 
reduction, vis-à-vis societal change does not happen overnight. It is a long, painstaking 
process, which require a revival of our indigenous ways of living while creative adapting to 
the rapidly changing political and physical worlds we live in. 
 
Conclusion 
 As shown in this chapter, all of the aforementioned types of work are part of disaster 
recovery work that stem from a few basic principles of LCDE and EVRAP: first, disaster 
survivors must actively be involved in recovery; second, that recovery work is inseparable 
from addressing the root causes that makes their communities vulnerable to disasters; and 
third, disaster recovery is a long-term process and requires a strong network of support from 
local and international actors. The very principles that mirror the spirit of bayanihan/tiklos, 
guide the approaches to LCDE and EVRAP’s work.  
Drawing on interviews, community accounts and secondary sources, I discussed how 
local actors take charge over their own recovery from the Yolanda disaster. POs and NGOs, 
as political entities, demonstrate a deep understanding of the political and economic 
conditions that increase their vulnerabilities to natural hazards such as typhoons. For 
instance, farmers associations employ a basic understanding that their poverty is a result of 
landlessness and the persistence of feudal relations, thus recovery initiatives entail return to 
communal farming practices. In the larger political scale, farmer associations and other 
organizations from fishing communities, urban dwellers and churches, formed an alliance to 
put direct pressure on the national government to improve recovery efforts. Through the unity 
of POs and NGOs, local communities in Eastern Visayas exercise agency over their own 
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recovery from disasters, as well as take charge of their local development. It is through POs 
and NGOs understanding of disasters, their ability to navigate the contradictions in the 
humanitarian aid industry, and their holistic approaches to disaster recovery, that prioritizes 
local development and self-empowerment, that contributes to the region’s capacity to resist 
the consolidation of Canadian imperialism in their region. 
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Conclusion  
When Typhoon Yolanda struck the Philippines, the LCDE office was completely damaged. 
Eight of the LCDE staff members were staying in the office at that time. Outside of 
interviews, while talking over dinner, or in car rides, the staff would recall their experiences 
as survivors of Typhoon Yolanda. They described vivid images of how it was difficult to 
even walk without the wind knocking them off balance, how they sought refuge in a small 
structure while holding the roof to keep it from being blown away, and how they watched a 
newborn cry from a neighbour’s rooftop. Jerusalem recalled how when she arrived in Palo, 
she drove past the office because it was beyond recognition. But the LCDE staff also 
remembered how their former project beneficiaries visited their office to check if they were 
still alive. Based on their account: “peasant leaders came to help, it was their way to pay us 
back,” (Jerusalem, personal interview, 2016).  
Most of the iNGOs have packed up and left. What remains are the huge letters that 
spelled USAID on convenient store signs, OXFAM on water tanks, UNICEF tarpaulins, 
European Union tents. I heard one of the NGO workers say, “palakihan sila ng mga sign 
[they tried to outcompete each other over the size of their signs].” The counterinsurgency 
program remains to be in effect. The number of AFP personnel on the roads of Leyte at night 
was astounding, as Yolanda survivors slept in cramped temporary shelters. POs express 
anxiety over the potential restoration of the former US base in Guiuan, an island south of 
Samar, however, the strengthening resolution of POs and NGO workers to rebuild their lives 
prevail, exuding the true spirit of bayanihan.  
Initially, I traced how the Canadian government extended support in post-Yolanda 
disaster recovery and rehabilitation in the Philippines that signalled attempts to consolidate 
its imperialist presence in the country. The geohistorical connections between the two 
countries are multi-pronged and shaped by a triadic relation: first, the Philippines as the top 
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source of immigrants in Canada since 2014; second, Canadian companies, both fully or 
partly-owned, place Canada as the top country with most mining tenements and the largest 
tenement area; third, the two countries’ military forces have a formalized MoU on joint 
military training. The first stage of my research exposed Canada’s interest in the 
counterinsurgency programs, which on paper, are aimed at resolving the armed conflict 
between the established state, the Republic of the Philippines and the Communist Party of the 
Philippines (CPP), the New People’s Army (NPA) and the National Democratic Front 
(NDF). Canada, in fact, has listed CPP-NPA as a ‘foreign terrorist organization’ since 2002. 
The most recent counterinsurgency plan, Oplan Bayanihan, utilizes NGOs to conduct 
programs that can undermine support for the armed struggle. This approach complements the 
Devonshire Initiative (DI), a consortium between mining companies and iNGOs. DI has been 
criticized by anti-mining groups as facilitating the use of iNGOs as the ‘trojan horse of 
neoliberalism,’ arguing that the iNGOs are used by the resource extractive industry to 
promote neoliberal approaches to development. In Eastern Visayas, civilians have also been 
targets of the counterinsurgency program, including people involved in post-Yolanda disaster 
recovery efforts. Jefferson Custodio, a volunteer of LCDE, was a victim of extrajudicial 
killings in 2004. 
Eastern Visayas, the site of this research, was a region with a strong history of local 
organizing that manifested through the establishment of local NGOs, such as LCDE and 
EVRAP, and the proliferation of POs, especially amongst peasants in the interiors. While the 
first stage of the research revealed the various measures the Canadian public and private 
sectors have put in place that could potentially advance their interests in the region through 
disaster recovery and rehabilitation efforts, communities have found ways to resist, or even 
subvert Canadian imperialism in their region. As discussed in Chapter 2, POs actively 
organize to resist the expansion of mining corporations in their area. And as articulated in 
 79 
both Chapter 2 and 3, the strong unity between local NGOs and POs demonstrate a basic 
understanding of how the humanitarian aid industry could be used to undermine their own 
communities’ interests. As a result, LCDE exercises prudence when selecting which iNGOs 
to partner with, specifically only collaborating with ones that respect their autonomy and 
whose projects complement the priorities of the POs they work with. 
Drawing from interviews, community accounts and secondary sources, I examined 
how local actors take charge of their own recovery from the Yolanda disaster. POs and 
NGOs, as political entities, demonstrate a deep understanding of the political and economic 
conditions that increase their vulnerabilities to natural hazards such as typhoons. For 
instance, farmers associations employ a basic understanding that their poverty is a result of 
landlessness and the persistence of feudal relations, thus recovery initiatives entail return to 
communal farming practices. In the larger political scale, farmers’ associations and other 
organizations from fishing communities, urban dwellers and churches, formed an alliance to 
put direct pressure on the national government to improve recovery efforts. 
Through the unity of POs and NGOs, local communities in Eastern Visayas exercise 
agency over their own recovery from disasters, as well as take charge of their local 
development. It is through POs and NGOs understanding of disasters, their ability to navigate 
the contradictions in the humanitarian aid industry, and their holistic approaches to disaster 
recovery, that prioritizes local development and self-empowerment, that contributes to the 
region’s capacity to resist the consolidation of Canadian imperialism in their region. 
 
Peace negotiations between GRP and CPP-NPA-NDF 
 
 The summer of El Nino in the Philippines was also the summer of campaigning for 
the national elections. Rodrigo Duterte, the mayor of Davao City, was considered the 
‘maverick.’ Once a student of Jose Maria Sison, one of the founding members of CPP, his 
tenure as a mayor earned him the label ‘the Punisher,’ due to his controversial approaches to 
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curb drug trafficking in the city. He ran under the platform of unity — through national 
industrialization, fighting graft and corruption, and the resumption of peace talks and 
upholding peace agreements with the CPP-NPA-NDF, the Moro National Liberation Front 
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. A staunch nationalist and critic of US imperialist 
interventions in the Middle East, he won the devotion of many marginalized sectors who 
once thought that the elections were only an exercise of democracy for the rich. When I was 
in the Philippines, masses of people campaigned for Duterte out of their own initiative, 
printing posters, banners and flyers out of their own pockets. He won by a landslide victory 
on May 10, 2016. Since then, he has offered few seats on the Cabinet to the NDF, including 
the secretary position for the Department of Agrarian Reform. 
The resumption of the peace negotiations could signal the end of the 
counterinsurgency programs and the beginning of systematic changes in the Philippines. 
During the Ramos presidency from 1992 to 1998, the National Unification Commission’s 
‘Six Paths to Peace’ was accepted, and remains to be the framework of the peace process. 
The “pursuit of social, economic, and political reforms aimed at addressing the root causes of 
armed struggle and social unrest” as listed as the first path (Ferrer, 2014, p. 83). However, the 
National Unification Commission recommendations have not materialized since the 
breakdown of the peace talks after 2002. CPP-NPA is again listed amongst the 58 “US 
Government Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations” in the most recent “Country 
Reports on Terrorism 2015.” The implications of the ‘global war on terror’ to the 
negotiations remain to be one of the major concerns of peace advocates in the Philippines. 
But what do the peace talks have to do with disaster recovery in Eastern Visayas? As 
discussed in detail in Chapter 1, the counterinsurgency program, aimed to defeat the CPP-
NPA-NDF forces, have resulted instead in the increase of military violence directed at POs 
and NGOs. These have greatly impacted the work of POs and NGOs in Eastern Visayas to 
 81 
properly carry out effective and timely disaster response and recovery projects. The end of 
the counterinsurgency programs could potentially ease the militarization of the region, and 
stop the tragedy of civilians as collateral damage of longest-running insurgency in Asia. 
At the same time, the systemic economic and social reforms as possible outcomes of 
the peace negotiations can also have profound impacts on Eastern Visayas. Landlessness and 
poverty that has plagued the majority of the peasant population, compounded by their 
vulnerability to typhoons, have made EV now the poorest region in the Philippines. The 
return of land to peasants is one of the economic reforms on the peace negotiations table. If 
fulfilled, the efforts of peasant organizations of balik-uma, which is the act of reclaiming land 
from landlords, and tiklos, a form of mutual labour exchange in communal farming, could be 
further supported. The development of local economies result in an increase in self-reliance. 
And following the logic of Community-based Disaster Management employed by LCDE and 
EVRAP, economic reforms in the region will inevitably increase the communities’ capacity 
to mitigate the impacts of future hazards, natural or human-induced. 
 
Bayanihan through the international humanitarian aid industry 
 
 Despite Yolanda being widely recognized as a product of climate change, the voice of 
Yolanda survivors were not present in the 2015 UN Climate Change Conference, or COP21. 
“Inis na inis kami sa talks sa Paris [We are angered by the talks in Paris],” shares Tala 
(personal interview, 2016). She emphasizes that capping the greenhouse emissions of 
developing countries like the Philippines, who contribute only a fraction of global emissions, 
will not prevent more super typhoons such as Yolanda from occurring. In fact, she argues 
“that developed and more industrialized countries should have a stronger commitment to 
reduce greenhouse emissions. The emission restriction on countries like the Philippines 
simply acts as another barrier towards industrialization.”  
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“Kung hindi industrialized ang bansa, prone yuon sa disaster. Ang disaster 
nandyan dahil sa kahirapan. Hindi gawa ng diyos. Kaya ang ano natin diyan ay 
hayaang umunlad ang Pilipinas at ang mamamayang Pilipino, para naman sa 
panahon ng kalamidad ay kayang-kaya natin harapin ang mga apektado. Yung 
mga apektado yung mga vulnerable ay yung mga mahihirap… [If a country is not 
industrialized, that country is prone to disasters. Disasters are caused by poverty. It 
is not an act of god. What we want is for the development of the Philippines and 
its citizens, so at the times of calamity, we are able to support the ones affected]” 
(Tala, personal interview, 2016).  
 
 
Several critical scholars and activists have warned us of the role of NGOs, 
international and humanitarian aid in undermining liberation struggles (Davis 2006; Smith, 
2007; Barry-Shaw and Jay, 2012). Yet the co-optation has never been a completed project. 
Liberation movements have also proven to be adaptable to the most dangerous of strategies 
of neoliberalism. In the case of NGOs involved in disaster recovery and rehabilitation in the 
Philippines, the conditions of the people compel them to not only employ neoliberal 
approaches to recovery. Ultimately, Yolanda was a harsh reminder that without investing in 
the long-term work of social transformation, marginalized sectors of the Philippines will 
remain to be the most vulnerable to intensifying natural hazards caused by climate change. 
 Exemplifying the true spirit of bayanihan, as demonstrated in this paper, local NGOs 
in Eastern Visayas, have learned to collaborate and create strong alliances with iNGOs and 
foreign donors to support the their community-based disaster management efforts. Centring 
the active participation of POs, the experience of EV demonstrate that a comprehensive 
approach to disaster risk reduction in necessary, if not, the only viable solution. This enriches 
current theorizing and extends the body of work on disaster and recovery. The paper also 
calls for a sense of collective consciousness. Not only is it our collective responsibility to 
mitigate the effects of worsening conditions brought about by climate change, we also have a 
task to recover the planet from centuries of plunder and exploitation. Such is a duty we have 
to fulfil if the lives of future generations matter to all of us.     
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Padayon! 
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Appendix B 
Eastern Visayas is mostly agricultural land. Here is a photo of the interior of Leyte province, 
taken from a tricycle.  
    (Source: Abis, 2016) 
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Appendix C 
 
Despite the mandated “No Dwelling Zone,” fishing communities still returned to their homes 
by the shore.  
 
 
 
(Source: Abis, 2016) 
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Appendix D 
 
BALSA Mindanao, a grassroots disaster response organization from Mindanao, donated this 
post-harvest tool to Yolanda survivors 
 
 
(Source: Abis, 2016) 
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Appendix E 
Materials from the People’s Surge Voters Education.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Abis, 2016) 
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Appendix F 
People’s Surge and other POs communicate their demands through street mobilizations. This 
photo was taken during the solidarity rally for Kidapawan farmers, on April 8, 2016. 
   (Source: Abis, 2016)  
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Appendix G 
 
List of Formal Interviews 
 
M. Jerusalem, Executive Director of LCDE, 6 April 2016 
 
Tala, member of People's Surge, 7 April 2016 
 
Lydia, peasant organizer, 8April 2016 
 
Marya, peasant organizer, 9 April 2016 
 
Artemio, EVRAP staff, 11 April 2016 
 
Lorena, LCDE staff, 11 April 2016 
 
Makaryo, LCDE staff, 11 April 2016 
 
Perla, LCDE staff, 11 April 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
